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ABSTRACT 
TINA L. JUILLERAT: The usefulness or uselessness of novelty: Re-examining assumptions 
about the relationship between creativity and innovation 
(Under the direction of David Hoffman and Francesca Gino) 
 
 
Creativity and innovation continue to attract significant attention from both scholars 
and practitioners, yet little is known about the processes by which ideas (i.e. potential 
innovations) are evaluated and selected following initial generation.  This research applied a 
behavioral decision research (BDR) perspective to test boundary conditions for a traditional 
assumption of the creativity and innovation literatures, the notion that increases in creative 
idea generation will increase the likelihood of innovation.  Two studies challenge the 
traditional assumption by demonstrating that the creativity component of novelty can be 
inversely related to subsequent idea evaluation and selection.  Study 1 found that idea 
novelty was negatively related to idea selection and recommendation after controlling for 
idea usefulness.  Study 2 replicated the negative relationship between idea novelty and idea 
selection, and also found that idea novelty and novelty goals interacted to negatively 
influence idea selection.  These findings suggest that scholars and practitioners need to 
devote greater attention to understanding idea evaluation and selection processes to translate 
creative efforts to actual innovation in organizations. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An Introduction to Creativity and Innovation 
Creativity and innovation have long been noted as the ultimate forces that drive 
civilization forward (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).  Creativity is typically defined as the 
generation of ideas that are both novel and useful (Amabile, 1988, 1996; Oldham & 
Cummings, 1996), with novelty representing the degree of uniqueness relative to other ideas 
currently available and usefulness indicating the potential to provide direct or indirect value 
in either the short or long term (Amabile, 1996; Zhou & Shalley, 2003).  Creativity has also 
frequently been linked to innovation, the intentional introduction and application of ideas, 
processes, products, or procedures which are new to the adopter and intended to provide 
significant benefits to an individual, group, organization, or society (West & Farr, 1990).  
Thus, creativity can be viewed as the generation of novel and useful ideas with the potential 
to translate to subsequent innovation through adoption and use. 
Since both creativity and innovation are clearly linked to ideas with the potential to 
provide important benefits, they are viewed as increasingly essential to our ability to address 
a myriad of societal challenges in both the public and private sector arenas (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004).  For example, many reformers have suggested that innovative 
school practices can remedy faltering educational performance (Kanter, 2006; Sternberg, 
2008), and creative designs for “green” products have great potential to mitigate 
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environmental threats such as declining natural resources or harmful emissions (Nidumolu, 
Prahalad, & Rangaswami, 2009).  Similarly, creativity and innovation are believed to 
promote organizational effectiveness and survival (Amabile, 1996; Nonaka, 1991) in the 
private sector.  The development and use of creative and innovative ideas enables business 
organizations to adapt to challenging environments characterized by increasing uncertainty, 
competition, and technological change (George, 2008; Greenhalgh, Robert, Bate, 
Macfarlane, & Kyriakidou, 2005; Klein & Sorra, 1996; Oldham, 2002; Shalley, Zhou, & 
Oldham, 2004).  For example, Apple (formerly known as Apple Computer) has thrived after 
responding to unfavorable conditions in its former core business of computer hardware by 
transforming into a provider of new software, entertainment, and consumer products and 
services such as iTunes software, the Apple Music Store, and iPod and iPhone consumer 
devices (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008; Rigby, Gruver, & Allen, 2009). 
Not surprisingly, businesses and consultants are peddling an array of new tools which 
promise to dramatically improve creativity and innovation.  Eli Lilly’s initiative to solicit 
innovative ideas to revitalize its drug pipeline was so successful that it was spun off as a new 
business venture.  The resulting company, named Innocentive, provides innovation services 
to other organizations, which include hosting “challenges” or contests for “solvers” to 
propose solutions to clients’ most difficult problems (Chesbrough & Graman, 2009).  IDEO, 
the product design consulting firm, has developed a new service offering based on the notion 
that the techniques which it has successfully employed to design innovative products can be 
extended to help client organizations become more creative and innovative (Brown, 2009). 
Given this level of hope, enthusiasm, and spending, it is clearly important to 
understand creativity and innovation.  Moreover, although some researchers have tended to 
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define innovation in terms of creativity (George, 2008; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), they 
are clearly distinct concepts (Anderson et al., 2004; Shalley, 2002), and understanding 
creativity and innovation thus also requires recognizing the fundamental differences between 
them (Shalley et al., 2004; West, 2002).  In colloquial terms, innovation scholars have 
suggested that creativity involves thinking about new things, whereas innovation involves 
doing new things (West & Rickards, 1999).  Similarly, creativity scholars have described 
creative ideas as the “raw material” for subsequent innovation (Shalley et al., 2004).  More 
formally, creativity researchers have suggested that creativity be conceptualized as a first yet 
necessary step in the innovation process (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988).  According to this 
view, creativity involves the development of novel and potentially useful ideas, but 
innovation only occurs when the ideas are implemented within a unit or organization 
(Amabile, 1996).  Innovation researchers have similarly suggested that idea generation alone 
can be considered creativity, in contrast to innovation which has an inherent application 
element, and thus includes both idea generation and implementation (Anderson et al., 2004).  
In sum, both creativity and innovation researchers have generally agreed that creativity is a 
first stage in the innovation process and involves the development of ideas, whereas 
innovation is the application and implementation of ideas in practice (West, 1997).  
Consequently, the term ‘idea’ will be used in this research to reflect not only creative 
outputs, but also innovation inputs in the form of potential innovations. 
Overview of Creativity Research 
Given the significance of creativity and innovation, it is not surprising that research 
on both topics has also mushroomed.  Within the domain of creativity, a considerable number 
of new publication outlets have emerged, and the topic has also garnered increased interest in 
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mainstream journals within disciplines such as psychology and organizational behavior 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).  As a result, creativity scholars have created a vast body of 
literature and empirical studies regarding a large number of contextual and individual factors 
which can promote or inhibit the generation of creative ideas (Shalley et al., 2004). 
Within group and organizational contexts, a number of variables have been found to 
significantly enhance or inhibit creative performance, such as job complexity (Amabile & 
Gryskiewicz, 1989; Farmer, Tierney, & Kung-McIntyre, 2003; Oldham & Cummings, 1996), 
supervisory (Amabile & Conti, 1999; Frese, Teng, & Wijnen, 1999; Shalley & Gilson, 2004) 
and coworker (Madjar, Oldham, & Pratt, 2002; Zhou & George, 2003) relationships, rewards 
and evaluation systems (Amabile, 1996; Baer, Oldham, & Cummings, 2003; Zhou & 
Shalley, 2003), the physical workspace (Oldham, Cummings, & Zhou, 1995; Shalley & 
Oldham, 1997), temporal dynamics (Amabile, Hadley, & Kramer, 2002; Andrews & Smith, 
1996), creativity prompts (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004; 
Unsworth, Wall, & Carter, 2005), networks (Perry-Smith, 2006; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005), and 
psychological safety (George, 2008; Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004).  For 
example, studies have found fairly consistent relationships between job complexity and 
creativity (Shalley et al., 2004), including positive relationships between objective measures 
of employee job complexity and supervisor ratings of creativity (Tierney & Farmer, 2002), as 
well as positive relationships between employee self-reported job complexity and the number 
of creative ideas submitted to an organizational suggestion system (Hatcher, Ross, & Collins, 
1989). 
At the individual level, a number of personality (Rodan & Galunic, 2004; Tierney & 
Farmer, 2002) and cognitive style (Kirton, 1994; Kwang & Rodrigues, 2002; Tierney, 
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Farmer, & Graen, 1999; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993) dimensions have been found to 
either promote or inhibit creativity.  For example, the “Big Five” personality trait of openness 
to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1997) has been found to promote creativity in several 
studies across a variety of domains (Feist, 1998), including manager ratings of employee 
creativity within an organizational setting (Scratchley & Hakstian, 2000).  Finally, creativity 
researchers have also made progress in exploring and identifying the mechanisms through 
which individual and contextual factors may translate to creativity and idea generation, such 
as intrinsic motivation (Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990; Shin & Zhou, 2003), 
affective mood states (Isen, 1999; Madjar & Oldham, 2002; George & Zhou, 2001), and 
creative processes (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Mumford, 2000). 
Overview of Innovation Research 
Innovation scholars have similarly developed a substantial base of research 
knowledge over the past several decades (Anderson, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004; West, 2002), 
including the individual, group or team, and organizational factors which facilitate or inhibit 
innovation.  At the individual level, a number of motivational (Amabile & Conti, 1999; 
Frese, Teng, & Wijnen, 1999), job design (Cordery, 1996; Axtell, Holman, Unsworth, Wall, 
Waterson, & Harrington, 2000), personality (Barron & Harrington, 1981; George & Zhou, 
2001), cognitive ability (Kirton, 1976; Patterson, 1999), and affective (George, 1996; Zhou 
& George, 2002) dimensions have been found to facilitate innovation (Anderson et al., 2004; 
West, 2002). 
Similarly, at the workgroup or team level, innovation is influenced by various team 
member characteristics (De Dreu, 1997; Paulus, 2002), team structure (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1992; West & Anderson, 1996), team process (Nemeth & Owens, 1996; Sutton & Hargadon, 
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1996), team leadership (Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 1999; Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2001), and 
team climate (De Dreu & West, 2001; Edmondson, 1999) dimensions (Anderson et al., 2004; 
West, 2002).  For example, a number of studies have found team climates with support for 
innovation, in which attempts to innovate are rewarded rather than punished (Kanter, 1983), 
to be positively related to objective measures of team innovation within health care (West & 
Anderson, 1996), TV production (Carter & West, 1998), and community mental health 
(Borrill et al., 2000) settings. 
Moreover, researchers have also identified important organization-level enablers of 
innovation (Birkinshaw et al., 2008; West et al., 2004) including organizational strategy 
(Burgelman, 1991; Miles & Snow, 1978), organizational size (Rogers, 2003), organizational 
structure (Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly, 1981), organizational resources (Damanpour, 1991; 
Kanter, 1983), and organizational culture (Madjar et al., 2002; West & Anderson, 1992).  
Finally, innovation research has expanded from an initial focus on technological innovation 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994) to the examination of additional forms of 
innovation such as process innovation (Pisano, 1996), service innovation (Gallouj & 
Weinstein, 1997), strategic innovation (Hamel, 1998), and management innovation 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2008). 
Open Questions 
Despite this impressive body of research on creativity and innovation, important 
questions remain relatively neglected, poorly understood, or unexamined entirely (Mumford, 
2003; West, 2002).  Although creativity and innovation include several sequential stages 
including problem construction, information gathering, conceptual combination, idea 
generation, idea evaluation, implementation planning, and monitoring (Mumford & 
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Gustafson, 1988; Mumford, 1991), most studies have focused on idea generation (Blair & 
Mumford, 2007; West, 2002).  However, since innovation does not occur unless the ideas 
generated are also selected to be implemented (Levine, Choi, & Moreland, 2003; Mumford, 
2003), creativity or idea generation is a necessary but insufficient condition for innovation 
(George, 2008; Nijstad & DeDreu, 2002; Shalley et al., 2004).  As a result, although research 
has made significant progress in understanding creative idea generation (Licuanan, Dailey, & 
Mumford, 2007; Litchfield, 2008; Lonergan, Mumford, & Scott, 2004), the relationship 
between idea generation and implementation remains poorly understood (Mumford, 2003; 
Runco & Chand, 1994; West, 2002). 
Surprisingly, little research has examined what actually happens once ideas have been 
generated (Shalley et al., 2004; West, 2002).  How and why new ideas and practices are 
adopted have long been central questions in management and organizational theory, yet 
research exploring exactly what motivates adoption decisions has received a surprising lack 
of attention (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; West, 2002).  For example, idea evaluation, the process 
by which an idea is tested or appraised according to various criteria or standards to determine 
whether it represents a potentially ‘useful’ product in the focal domain (Amabile, 1996; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999), has been relatively neglected (Blair & Mumford, 2007; Lonergan, 
Scott, & Mumford, 2004).  Similarly, idea selection, which refers to the decision to adopt or 
use an innovation (Choi & Chang, 2009; Nijstad & De Dreu, 2002), is also poorly 
understood. 
Although their view is not uncontested (Litchfield, 2008), several scholars have 
suggested that creativity or idea generation is “the easy bit” (Shalley, 2002; West, 2002) 
compared to subsequent adoption and innovation.  Indeed, leaders at companies such as IBM 
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or Microsoft can be bombarded with thousands of ideas from employees (Bjelland & Wood, 
2008; Bruch & Menges, 2010).  In contrast, subsequent processes such as idea evaluation and 
selection are not only equally necessary for innovation (Runco & Smith, 1992), but may be 
significantly more difficult given the complexity of evaluating novel and unproven ideas 
(Mumford, Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006).  Since the likelihood of success for each 
idea is uncertain (Cardinal & Hatfield, 2000) and only a small subset of the myriad ideas 
which are generated can be implemented (West, 2002), both effective idea evaluation and 
idea selection are directly related to desired innovation outcomes.  How exactly might the 
sponsor of an Innocentive contest or a leader at Microsoft or IBM evaluate and ultimately 
select the most promising idea(s) to implement from a myriad of alternatives? 
Unfortunately, little is known about the processes used to evaluate these ideas with 
uncertain outcomes or the selection processes which govern choices among the ideas which 
have been generated (Blair & Mumford, 2007; Nijstad & De Dreu, 2002).  As a result, 
increasing understanding of the factors which promote the implementation of ideas into 
practice may ultimately be the most critical determinant of outcomes (Lonergan, Mumford, 
& Scott, 2004; West, 2002), and is an important and urgent priority (Mumford, 2003; Runco 
& Smith, 1992).  To address this need, this research will proceed through several stages. 
Chapter 2 will briefly explore the creativity and innovation literatures to examine 
potential sources of this gap in knowledge about the idea evaluation and selection processes 
which are believed to link creativity and innovation, and to propose that it results from a 
shared but untested assumption between two very similar literatures.  In Chapter 3, a 
behavioral decision research (BDR) perspective will be applied to examine and ultimately 
challenge the reasonableness of an assumption shared by the two literatures: the notion that 
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increased creativity will increase the likelihood of innovation.  Chapter 4 will extend the 
BDR framework to develop new theory and hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
creative idea generation and implementation.  More specifically, BDR perspectives on the 
availability, representativeness, and categorization heuristics will be applied to propose that 
decision makers will auomatically and reflexively discount and perceive novel (unique) ideas 
to be less useful.  Similarly, BDR perspectives on the endowment effect, system justification 
theory, and the appraisal tendency framework will be extended to propose that decision 
makers will automatically and reflexively discount novel (new) ideas and perceive them to be 
less useful.  Based on the insights provided by these perspectives, the traditional assumption 
that increased creativity promotes innovation will be re-examined.  This research will 
propose that the relationship between creativity and innovation is more complex than 
traditionally expected, and thus that increases in creativity do not necessarily promote 
increased innovation.  Chapter 5 will describe and report the results from the first of two 
empirical studies used to test the new theory and hypotheses.  Next, based on the results of 
the first empirical study, Chapter 6 will refine and extend the theoretical model.  Chapter 7 
will describe and report the results from a second empirical study, which was designed to test 
the refined theory and hypotheses.  Finally, Chapter 8 will discuss this research within the 
broader context of creativity and innovation scholarship, including its theoretical 
contribution, limitations, possible extensions via future research, and practical implications. 
 CHAPTER 2 
FURTHER EXPLORATION OF THE CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
LITERATURES 
The Development and Evolution of Two Literatures 
On the one hand, the lack of focus on the relationship between creative idea 
generation and implementation, including the processes of idea evaluation and selection, is 
surprising.  However, such a gap may be more understandable when viewed within the 
context of the historical development of the creativity and innovation literatures.  For 
example, the relatively separate evolution of the two literatures could provide one potential 
explanation of the gap.  Creativity research has traditionally been the domain of social 
psychologists, focused primarily on individual level outcomes, and conducted with 
experimental methods and relatively short time horizons.  In contrast, innovation research has 
more often been the domain of organizational scholars, focused on organizational level 
outcomes, and conducted with field and often longitudinal methods.  As such, the community 
of creativity scholars has tended to focus on the individual personality and social 
psychological influences (George, 2008) on the generation of ideas, including underlying 
causal mechanisms.  Innovation scholars, on the other hand, have devoted greater attention to 
what makes organizations more or less capable of adopting new practices or technologies 
(Strang & Soule, 1998) and thus have had much less to say about generative mechanisms 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2008).  In sum, the relatively separate development of both literatures has 
resulted in two streams of research which are highly focused on either idea generation or idea 
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implementation, as opposed to questions regarding the relationship between these two 
necessary steps in the innovation process (Nijstad & DeDreu, 2002). 
Similarities and Shared Assumptions 
On the one hand, the separate development of the creativity and innovation literatures 
seems to be an intuitive explanation for the lack of attention devoted to the relationship 
between idea generation and idea implementation.  However, despite being published in 
different domains by different researchers, the two literatures have also often discussed 
similar constructs, and thus it is also important to consider their common elements.  Indeed, 
despite the separate development of the creativity and innovation literatures, closer 
examination reveals many similarities and overlaps between the two domains of scholarship.  
First, both literatures have examined similar factors which may promote or inhibit the desired 
outcome (e.g. creativity or innovation).  Not only have both domains examined similar levels 
of analysis such as individual, team, and organizational factors (Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010; West, 2002), but many of the factors shown to influence creativity at a particular level 
have also separately been shown to influence innovation.  For example, group psychological 
safety has been linked to both creativity (Edmondson & Mogelof, 2006; George, 2008) and 
innovation (Edmondson, 1999; Gibson & Gibbs, 2006; West, 2002).  Both literatures have 
also noted that these influences can significantly impact the ability to generate ideas or to 
innovate, although the innovation literature has also examined factors which influence 
successful implementation of innovations (Klein, Conn, & Sorra, 2001; Klein & Knight, 
2005) following the decision to adopt (i.e. after idea selection). 
Second, the constructs used to measure or assess creativity and innovation have also 
tended to be similar.  Both literatures have tended to conceptualize the focal outcome in 
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terms of novelty and usefulness (Amabile, 1996; West & Farr, 1990), as well as to employ 
very similar conceptions of relevant constructs and their underlying dimensions.  For 
example, within the domain of novelty, each literature has highlighted distinctions between 
absolute and relative novelty, which respectively represent whether something is entirely new 
or merely new to the relevant unit of adoption (Anderson & King, 1983; Shalley et al., 2004).  
Both areas of research have also employed continuum models to assess novelty.  For 
example, innovation research has indicated that innovations can range from small and 
incremental to radical and competence destroying.  More specifically, innovations can be 
categorized as improvement, incremental, ad hoc, recombinative, formalization, or radical 
based on the degree and nature of change they imply for an existing system (Gallouj & 
Weinstein, 2007).  Similarly, creativity scholars have also noted that creative ideas can 
represent either incremental or radical departures from the status quo (George, 2008; 
Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Shalley et al., 2004).  For example, creativity research has 
distinguished between “Little C” and “Big C” forms of creativity, which respectively 
represent “daily problem solving and the ability to adapt to change” versus “relatively rare 
displays of creativity that have a major impact on others” (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). 
Third, both literatures not only employ stage process models by which they are 
purported to improve organizational outcomes, but the respective models also exhibit 
similarities and overlaps despite the use of slightly different terminology.  As noted 
previously, creativity is believed to involve stages such as problem construction, information 
gathering, concept selection, conceptual combination, idea generation, idea evaluation, 
implementation planning, and monitoring (Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, & 
Doares, 1991).  Innovation researchers have also suggested that innovation proceeds 
13 
according to stages, which include awareness, adoption, implementation, and routinization 
(Rogers, 2003).  Although there appears to be limited overlap between the respective stage 
models during the early stages of creativity, such as problem construction, information 
gathering, or concept selection, the latter idea generation, idea evaluation, implementation 
planning, and monitoring stages within the creativity literature appear to exhibit substantial 
overlap with the innovation literature stages of awareness, adoption, implementation, and 
routinization. 
Fourth, both creativity and innovation researchers reference similar mechanisms by 
which individual or contextual factors may promote the desired proximal outcomes (e.g. 
creativity or innovation).  For example, group processes such as effective conflict 
management have been positively linked to both creativity (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988) 
and innovation (Nemeth, 1986; West, 2002).  Similarly, researchers have also linked 
individual and group integrative processes to creativity (Taggar, 2002) and innovation 
(Stevens & Campion, 1994; Anderson et al., 2004).  Perhaps more importantly, both 
literatures have recognized and emphasized that creativity and innovation include significant 
motivational and cognitive components or processes.  For example, scholars examining 
innovation have noted that cognition is essential to the process of adoption (George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Ocasio, 1997).  Similarly, 
creativity researchers have noted that creativity is a complex and highly cognitive activity 
(Runco, 2004) which can involve underlying cognitive operations such as conceptualization 
(Mumford, Olsen, & James, 1989), imagination (Singer, 1999), incubation (Smith & Dodds, 
1999), insight (Sternberg & Davidson, 1999), intuition (Policastro, 1999), Janusian 
simultaneous consideration of perspectives (Rothenberg, 1999), logic (Johnson-Laird, 1999), 
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metaphor (Gibbs, 1999), mindfulness (Moldoveanu & Langer, 1999), misjudgment (Runco 
1999a), perceptgenesis (Smith, 1999), and perspective taking (Runco 1999b).  Noting the 
highly cognitive nature of the creative process, creativity scholars have increasingly 
advocated greater attention to how cognition and “the mind” (George, 2008) influence 
creativity in organizations. 
Finally, the similarity between the two research streams might be expected to 
promote convergence and confidence in common or shared knowledge.  However, the 
substantial overlaps between the two literatures have also resulted in shared gaps and 
weaknesses given the tendency to explore (or neglect) many of the same questions; examine 
similar concepts and life cycle stages; and adopt the same underlying assumptions.  For 
example, both communities of researchers have tended to advocate that maximization of the 
final stage outcome (e.g. creativity or innovation) is a universal good, although both 
literatures have also recently begun to advocate a more balanced view that creativity could 
have unintended or even negative consequences (Anderson et al., 2004; George, 2008; 
Mumford, 2003; West & Anderson, 1992).  More significantly, scholars have also noted that 
research has been characterized by a traditional yet unexamined assumption that increased 
creativity is not only inherently desirable, but inevitably produces greater innovation and 
other desirable outcomes (Mumford, 2003; Paulus, 2002; Shalley et al., 2004; West, 2002). 
On the one hand, the belief that greater creativity equates to greater innovation is 
somewhat understandable given the similarities between the literatures and some resulting 
confusion about the difference between them.  However, the traditional assumption that more 
creativity translates to more innovation has tended to foreclose explicit consideration of the 
relationship between the two constructs, and thus has obscured understanding of relationships 
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between idea generation and implementation.  Fortunately, scholars in both domains have 
increasingly begun to advocate exploration of unexamined assumptions and previously 
neglected questions (Birkinshaw et al., 2008; George, 2008; Nijstad & De Dreu, 2002; 
Shalley et al., 2004).  For example, scholars have increasingly highlighted that existing 
models are only a first step, and that plausible model assumptions and propositions must be 
subjected to direct empirical test (Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 2004).  Similarly, creativity 
researchers have begun to advance potential models of the idea evaluation process 
(Mumford, Lonergan, & Scott, 2002) which might increase understanding of the relationship 
between idea generation and implementation. 
 CHAPTER 3 
AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE ON CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
Although traditional assumptions which tend to equate creativity with innovation 
have yet to attract much conceptual attention or empirical scrutiny (George, 2008), they do 
not appear to be entirely unreasonable.  Indeed, the notion that an increase in the presence of 
creative ideas will increase the likelihood that creative ideas will be selected and 
implemented (Shalley et al., 2004) seems logical and intuitively appealing.  Since creativity 
is most frequently defined in terms of ideas with high novelty and usefulness (George, 2008), 
an increase in creativity can be reasonably conceptualized as either 1) an increase in the 
number of ideas (holding novelty and usefulness constant); 2) an increase in the novelty of 
ideas (holding the number of ideas and usefulness constant); or 3) an increase in the 
usefulness of ideas (holding the number of ideas and novelty constant).  As such, an 
individual, team, or organization which receives a boost in the presence of creativity as 
defined above (e.g. more ideas of equal novelty and usefulness, more novel ideas holding the 
number and usefulness of ideas constant, or more useful ideas holding the number and 
novelty of ideas constant), would be expected to ultimately select and implement a similar 
mix of ideas, resulting in a higher level of innovation. 
Re-Examining Traditional Assumptions 
While the traditional assumption seems plausible, much anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that the generation of creative ideas often fails to translate to favorable evaluation 
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and ultimately selection and innovation.  Extremely original and useful ideas are often not 
selected and even resoundingly rejected.  For example, J.D.  Rowling’s spectacularly 
successful Harry Potter series was rejected by numerous publishers, and many technology 
companies such as IBM failed to see the value in the personal computer (Licuanan, Dailey, & 
Mumford, 2007).  Consistent with this view, scholars have increasingly suggested that the 
traditional assumption should not be taken for granted and that creativity may not translate to 
innovation (George, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004).  Even as formidable an intellect as Emerson 
struggled to effectively evaluate creative ideas and translate them to innovation, noting “In 
every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a 
certain alienated majesty” (Emerson, 2009). 
Beyond anecdotal evidence, several findings from existing creativity and innovation 
research also highlight that the belief that creativity will lead to innovation warrants more 
careful consideration.  For example, prior research has suggested that certain contextual 
factors may be more effective in promoting creativity rather than innovation or vice versa 
(Nijstad & DeDreu, 2002).  More specifically, brainstorming research has long indicated that 
individuals are more effective than groups in generating creative ideas (Diehl & Stroebe, 
1987; Kerr & Tindale, 2004), yet innovation researchers have suggested that groups may be 
more effective than individuals in selecting and implementing ideas (Nijstad & DeDreu, 
2002).  As such, the notion that the factors which optimize creativity may differ from those 
which maximize innovation (West, 2002) challenges the assumption that an increase in the 
former one will lead to an increase in the latter.  Moreover, certain contextual factors, such as 
external demands, are believed to have opposing effects on creativity (Amabile, 1998) and 
innovation (West, 2002).  Granted, this finding relates to how creativity and innovation are 
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influenced by external demands, as opposed to the relationship between them.  However, it is 
difficult to reconcile the idea that more creativity promotes more innovation with the 
observation that creativity is inhibited by a contextual variable which is simultaneously 
believed to promote innovation. 
Similarly, established bases of evidence from several other research domains also 
seem to counter the notion that an increase in creativity will seamlessly increase subsequent 
idea selection and innovation.  First, consistent with the views of scholars who have noted 
that the generation of creative ideas may have unanticipated or even undesirable 
consequences (George, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004), an increase in the number of ideas could 
actually decrease innovation.  For example, an emerging literature in behavioral decision 
research (BDR) suggests that providing decision makers with more alternatives can actually 
reduce the likelihood that any of the various choices will be selected (Dhar, 1997; Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).  As a result, an increase in the number of 
creative ideas could reduce innovation by decreasing the likelihood that any of the ideas 
would be subsequently selected for implementation.  Second, the mere presence of more 
useful ideas does not appear to trigger increased idea selection and innovation.  Indeed, a 
substantial literature on the research-practice gap has illustrated that many useful ideas 
generated through research are not implemented in practice even when practitioners are 
provided with substantial evidence of their usefulness (Highhouse, 2008; Johns, 1993; Rynes, 
Bartunek, & Daft, 2001; Schmitt, 1997).  Finally, the mere presence of more novel ideas may 
not promote increases in idea selection and innovation.  For example, research on newcomer 
socialization has demonstrated that the ideas of newcomers, many of whom are hired 
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specifically to provide creative ideas and new perspectives, are typically rejected (Levine, 
Choi, & Moreland, 2003). 
Benefits of a New Perspective: Behavioral Decision Research (BDR) 
Given that the traditional assumption about the relationship between creativity and 
innovation is increasingly subject to challenge based on converging findings from several 
other literatures, further examination is clearly warranted.  On the one hand, the traditional 
view seems valid if idea evaluation and selection processes are optimally effective as implied 
by traditional rational and logical models of decision making (Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 
1999; Simon, 1956), which would predict that the most promising ideas will be selected and 
implemented.  Moreover, the traditional assumption may be reasonable even if evaluation 
and selection processes are not optimally accurate or effective.  After all, even if idea 
evaluation and selection are purely random processes, an increase in the average level of 
novelty or usefulness for the average idea would presumably result in the selection of more 
novel and/or useful ideas on average (Litchfield, 2008; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006).  
In sum, the traditional assumption seems reasonable if evaluation and selection processes are 
either entirely random and thus relatively benign, or accurate and effective in accordance 
with rational (and idealized) models of decision making. 
On the other hand, the traditional assumption is less tenable if evaluation and 
selection processes are neither optimally rational nor entirely random, and thus subject to 
systematic error.  For example, if decision makers make systematic errors in their evaluation 
and selection of highly novel ideas (e.g. the proposal for the first Harry Potter book), the 
traditional view would clearly be subject to challenge.  Interestingly, a long tradition of BDR 
scholarship illustrates that human judgment and decisions do not conform to rational ideals 
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and are subject to systematic errors and biases (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Simon, 1956; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Since 
these judgment and decision errors have been demonstrated in a number of domains in a 
variety of organizational settings (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Moore & Flynn, 2008), a BDR perspective provides a highly robust framework to examine 
and potentially challenge the traditional assumptions of the two literatures. 
A BDR perspective also provides a particularly useful lens for exploring the creativity 
and innovation literatures since researchers in both domains have emphasized that both 
processes are highly cognitive (Mumford, Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006; Runco, 
2004; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), yet have employed models of motivation and cognition with 
decidedly rationalist tenets and assumptions (Birkinshaw et al., 2008; Damanpour, 1987; 
George, 2008).  In contrast, a substantial body of BDR literature indicates that motivation 
and cognition are not entirely rational (Kunda, 1990; Larrick, 1993; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) 
and that rational models of behavior may be inappropriate for assessing individual and 
organizational behavior and decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; March, 1991; Simon, 1956; 
Tetlock, 1985).  Consistent with the view that a BDR framework can significantly inform 
topics of interest to organizational researchers (Moore & Flynn, 2008), the BDR perspective 
provides a particularly relevant framework for re-examining the creativity and innovation 
literatures given its ability to question the traditional rationalistic underpinnings or 
assumptions of the two domains.  Moreover, a BDR framework not only provides a means to 
challenge the rationalistic assumptions of the two literatures, but also can leverage a 
substantial base of existing research on cognitive biases and errors to predict how and when 
specific assumptions within the two literatures may be flawed.  This research will focus on 
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the traditional rationalistic assumption of the two literatures that an increase in creativity will 
increase innovation.  While an increase in creativity can be conceptualized as an increase in 
the number, usefulness, and/or novelty of ideas, this research will examine the effects of 
increased novelty.  Novelty was deemed most meaningful for relevant for purposes of this 
research since the BDR literature has already examined the relationship between number of 
choices and decision outcomes (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, Wells, & Schwarz, 2006), 
and the innovation literature (West & Anderson, 1992; 1996) has similarly examined the 
relationship between the perceived usefulness of an innovation and its subsequent 
implementation. 
 CHAPTER 4 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
BDR scholarship, which emphasizes that decision makers have cognitive limitations 
and thus make systematic errors in judgments and decisions (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 
1998; Larrick, 2004; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Simon, 1956; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
challenges the intuitive notion that an increase in creativity (e.g. idea generation) will result 
in greater selection and implementation of these potential innovations.  Since the BDR 
literature includes a vast array of decision making heuristics and resulting biases which have 
been reviewed extensively elsewhere (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kerr, McCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Moore & Flynn, 2008), this 
review will not consider the implications of the entire spectrum of BDR knowledge for idea 
evaluation and selection.  Rather, this analysis will highlight the clear relevance of BDR 
principles to innovation decisions by closely examining two cognitive biases which seem 
especially relevant to the relationship between creativity and innovation, including 
underlying processes of idea evaluation and selection. 
First, since both creativity and innovation have been defined in terms of novelty, any 
biases toward novelty seem especially relevant to innovation decisions.  Moreover, since 
people tend to exhibit strong preferences for the typical and familiar compared to more novel 
and unique alternatives which are less familiar (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Sanna, 
Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; Tellis, 2004; Zajonc, 2001), increases in creativity (i.e.  novelty) 
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thus may not translate to subsequent selection and implementation.  Second, since both the 
creativity and innovation literatures have emphasized that creativity and innovation can be 
conceptualized in terms of change relative to the status quo (Mumford & Gustafson, 2002; 
West, 2002), the status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988) is also especially pertinent 
to innovation decisions.  People often exhibit an irrational preference for the status quo 
compared to other alternatives (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & 
Napier, 2008; Sen & Johnson, 1997; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), and thus increases in 
creativity (i.e.  new ideas which represent greater change relative to the status quo) may not 
result in subsequent idea selection and implementation.  In sum, BDR research suggests that 
the very factors by which novelty is typically defined are also likely to be negatively related 
to subsequent evaluation, selection, and implementation.  Consequently, this analysis will 
challenge the premise that generation of creative ideas will consistently result in 
improvements in actual innovation (e.g. implementation). 
The Novelty Bias and the Systematic Devaluation of Novel (Unique) Ideas 
The established finding that people prefer the typical and familiar to more novel and 
unique hence less familiar alternatives (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz et al., 2007; Tellis, 
2004; Zajonc, 2001) suggests that decision makers are likely to exhibit a novelty bias, such 
that they may automatically view more novel and unique ideas as less useful.  This biased 
evaluation or judgment can be explained by decision makers’ reliance on several automatic 
and unconscious decision making heuristics, each of which has been established in prior 
BDR research. 
First, an extensive body of research on the availability heuristic has demonstrated that 
our assessments of the likelihood of the outcomes of our decisions are biased.  Rather than 
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simply reflecting true likelihoods based on actual outcome probabilities, they are influenced 
by the ease with which we can recall ‘available’ relevant examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  For example, a person estimating the likelihood that a particular investment will be 
successful will form more optimistic assessments when they can easily recall examples of 
investments which have been profitable than when they have difficulty identifying relevant 
exemplars.  Moreover, knowledge of the availability heuristic and resulting biases suggests 
that decision makers who intuitively use this heuristic are likely to perceive highly novel 
ideas as less useful.  For example, information related to highly novel and unique ideas may 
be less available and accessible in memory than information for less novel but more familiar 
alternatives.  As a result, decision makers assessing more novel ideas may generate lower 
assessments of potential benefits and/or lower judgments of the likelihood of success due to 
the relative difficulty of recalling relevant examples compared to the ease of recall for less 
novel and more familiar alternatives. 
Second, a substantial literature on the representativeness heuristic has illustrated that 
our judgments of probability or frequency are biased, since they are influenced by the degree 
of resemblance between our hypotheses and available data (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  For example, if a person has a hypothesis (i.e.  effective 
salespeople are talkative and attractive), and then encounters data which do not resemble the 
hypothesis (i.e.  a job candidate who is neither talkative nor especially attractive), he or she 
will tend to underestimate the probability of related judgments (e.g. that the job candidate 
will be an effective salesperson).  Moreover, knowledge of the representativeness heuristic 
and resulting biases suggests that decision makers who naturally apply this heuristic and its 
notion that “like equals like” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) are likely to perceive highly novel 
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and unique ideas as less useful.  For example, judgments of the probability for the 
“hypothesis” that an idea will solve a problem may be influenced by the degree to which the 
idea appears to represent (i.e.  be similar to) the problem domain.  However, since highly 
novel and unique ideas are unusual by definition, decision makers are likely to perceive less 
“likeness” or similarity between these potential innovations and most problem domains.  As a 
result, decision makers assessing more novel (i.e.  more unique) ideas may generate lower 
assessments of the probability that a novel idea will solve the problem in a given domain 
compared to less novel alternatives which appear to be more similar to the focal domain.  
More specifically, decision makers may generate lower judgments of the potential benefits 
and the likelihood of success for more novel and unique ideas compared to less novel and 
unique ideas, which are likely to be perceived as more representative and similar to the 
relevant problem domains. 
Third, an established literature on the cognitive processes of categorization has 
illustrated that our assessments of many objects are biased, because they are influenced not 
only by the items’ placements within categories (Dhar, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992), but 
also by the “mere presence” of meaningful or even arbitrary categories (Bettman, Luce, & 
Payne, 1998; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Mogilner, Rudnick, & Iyengar, 2008).  For example, 
research on the “categorical imperative” has demonstrated that objects which do not fit 
existing categories and cognitive schemas are automatically discounted and often outright 
dismissed (Urban, Hulland, & Weinberg, 1993; Zuckerman, 1999).  Moreover, knowledge of 
categorization cognitive processes suggests that decision makers who intuitively use this 
heuristic are likely to perceive highly novel ideas as less useful.  For example, highly novel 
(e.g. more unique) ideas will be less likely to “fit” or trigger associations with existing 
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categories and cognitive schemas, whereas less novel (e.g. less unique) alternatives are more 
likely to fit or be assimilated to existing categories and schemas.  As a result, decision 
makers assessing more novel and unique ideas may generate lower assessments of potential 
benefits and/or lower judgments of the likelihood of success due to the relative difficulty of 
“fitting” novel ideas into existing categories or schemas, which will result in the subsequent 
dismissal or discounting of their usefulness or even legitimacy. 
In sum, BDR research on availability, representativeness, and categorization 
heuristics suggests that decision makers will tend to discount novel (e.g. unique) ideas, 
automatically and reflexively perceiving them to be less useful.  Since the creativity and 
innovation literatures indicate that ideas which are both highly novel and highly useful are 
indeed rare (Litchfield, 2008; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006), this novelty heuristic or 
decision rule is highly functional and adaptive in most decision situations.  Nevertheless, it 
also suggests that decisions regarding novel ideas will be biased, since ideas which are higher 
in novelty will consistently be evaluated less favorably compared to less novel ideas.  
Moreover, since extant models suggest that creativity and innovation proceed through stages 
of idea generation, evaluation, selection, and implementation, these biased evaluations can 
also be expected to impact subsequent processes of selection and implementation.  As a 
result, ideas or potential innovations which are higher in novelty will not only be evaluated 
less favorably, but will also be selected less frequently via the preceding and mediating 
process of idea evaluation. 
The Status Quo Bias and the Systematic Devaluation of Novel (New) Ideas 
The established finding from BDR research that people often exhibit an irrational 
preference for the status quo compared to other alternatives (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; 
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Jost et al., 2008; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) suggests that 
decision makers are likely to exhibit a status quo bias, such that they will automatically view 
new ideas or potential innovations as less useful and desirable than existing alternatives.  
This biased evaluation can be explained by decision makers’ reliance on several automatic 
and unconscious cognitive processes, each of which has been established in prior BDR 
research. 
First, BDR research on the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) has indicated that our 
assessments of the value (i.e.  usefulness) of objects are often biased.  Rather than simply 
reflecting actual objective characteristics or benefits, they are influenced by whether or not 
we already own the focal objects (Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998).  In particular, people 
have a tendency to overvalue what they own, such that a person places a higher value on a 
good when they own it than otherwise (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).  For example, 
a home seller will think that their current house is worth more than they would be willing to 
pay for an equivalent home that they do not own (Bazerman & Moore, 2009).  Similarly, if a 
person owns a ticket to a sporting event, they will demand a higher selling price than they 
would have originally been willing to pay for the ticket (Carmon & Ariely, 2000). 
BDR scholars (Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, & Bilgin, 2007; Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1998) have suggested that the endowment 
effect may be explained by loss aversion, which is the tendency for the loss of an existing 
good to outweigh the potential gain from a new good of objectively equal value (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  Regardless of the underlying mechanism, 
the endowment effect represents a clear deviation from rational models of decision making, 
since objectively rational decision makers should express consistent preferences in their 
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buying and selling prices for the same good, and should also be indifferent between losses 
and gains of equal magnitude. 
Assuming ideas can be viewed as “goods” in the language of the BDR literature, the 
endowment effect has important implications for the evaluation and selection of new ideas.  
After all, a new idea often involves a change from an alternative already in possession, as 
when a new innovative medical technology might replace an existing medical procedure.  As 
a result, the selection and implementation of the new idea typically implies a change to the 
status quo and the possible loss of an existing (endowed) alternative.  According to BDR 
research on the endowment effect, objects that we already own or possess are valued more 
highly than equivalent items which we do not already own.  As a result, new ideas may be 
evaluated less favorably (i.e.  valued less) since existing (endowed) alternatives are valued 
more highly compared to alternatives not already in possession.  Similarly, BDR research on 
loss aversion indicates that losses are weighted more heavily than gains in decision making.  
As a result, new ideas and innovations are especially unlikely to be selected since decision 
makers will not only value the existing (e.g. status quo) alternative more highly than new 
alternatives, but will also weight the loss of the existing (e.g. status quo) alternative more 
heavily than the potential gain from the new alternative. 
Second, BDR research on system justification theory not only reinforces the 
predictions of the endowment effect literature, but also suggests that the preference for the 
status quo will exist even in the absence of endowment (Samuelson & Zeckhausen, 1988; 
Sen & Johnson, 1997), as when decision makers do not themselves possess or have direct 
experience with the existing (i.e.  status quo) solution or alternative.  According to theories of 
system justification, defined as a “process by which existing social arrangements are 
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legitimized” (Jost & Banaji, 1994: 2) people are highly motivated to rationalize and 
legitimate the existing social order or status quo.  Given this need to justify the existing order 
and system of arrangements, individuals have strong motivations to perceive the status quo to 
be legitimate and to evaluate it quo more favorably, even at the expense of personal or group 
interests (Jost et al., 2008).  For example, a person who clearly is disadvantaged within the 
existing social order, such as a low income person in a country with high income inequality 
or a low wage employee in an organization with significant pay differentials, may 
nevertheless express favorable views of high income inequality and other characteristics of 
the existing order.  In contrast to rational decision models which would suggest that these 
individuals might be the strongest advocates for change to the status quo, system justification 
theory and research suggest that the most disadvantaged often have the strongest motivations 
to defend the existing order (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), 
Moreover, since new ideas by definition represent changes to the existing order or 
status quo, system justification processes have important implications for the evaluation and 
selection of new ideas.  Since individuals are highly motivated to perceive the existing order 
to be legitimate and to evaluate it more favorably in order to justify the status quo, new ideas 
will be evaluated less favorably (i.e.  valued less) compared to existing status quo 
alternatives, which will be valued more highly to justify and rationalize the existing system 
of arrangements.  As a result, new ideas are also likely to be selected less frequently 
compared to existing status quo alternatives with otherwise equal characteristics and benefits.  
Moreover, these effects are likely to occur even among individuals who are clearly 
disadvantaged by the status quo and might seem to benefit the most from changes to existing 
arrangements. 
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Third, BDR research on the relationship between emotions and decision making 
further challenges the notion that new ideas will be evaluated and selected according to the 
predictions of rational decision models.  For example, although rational decision models 
indicate that emotions should be irrelevant to economic decisions, BDR scholars have found 
that emotions such as sadness or disgust can significantly influence buying and selling 
decisions (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004).  Moreover, within this domain of research 
on how emotions influence decision making, an emerging literature known as the ATF or 
appraisal tendency framework (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) provides insight into specific mechanisms which can be expected to 
reinforce the status quo bias. 
According to this perspective, emotions have motivational properties which shape 
subsequent judgments and decisions through specific appraisal themes or tendencies 
(Lazarus, 1994; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  As such, an ATF framework not only elaborates 
underlying mechanisms (e.g. appraisal tendencies) through which emotions influence 
decisions, but also provides further insight into how specific emotions may translate to biased 
judgments and decisions.  For example, the emotion of fear is associated with the motivation 
to eliminate current threats or avoid future threats, and thus the appraisal tendency to form 
more pessimistic assessments of risk (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Lerner, Gonzalez, 
Small, & Fischoff, 2003).  Similarly, the emotion of anxiety has been linked to the 
motivation to avoid threats and risks, and thus a heightened appraisal tendency regarding 
uncertainty.  As a result, individuals experiencing fear or anxiety will tend to perceive 
situations and ideas as more risky and uncertain, and also to be motivated to avoid or reduce 
risk and uncertainty (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
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Combined with system justification theory, ATF research provides further support for 
the status quo bias and the notion that existing alternatives will be favored relative to new 
ideas.  For example, system justification theory suggests that the introduction of a new idea 
may trigger perceptions of threat to the legitimacy of the existing system.  Since individuals 
who feel threatened experience emotions such fear and anxiety, the appraisal tendencies 
associated with these emotions may also influence subsequent judgments and decisions about 
the ideas.  More specifically, the appraisal tendencies associated with fear and anxiety may 
translate to less favorable evaluations by motivating decision makers to perceive new 
alternatives as more risky and more uncertain.  As a result of these heighted perceptions of 
risk and uncertainty, decision makers will tend to form lower assessments of potential 
benefits and the likelihood of success for new ideas.  As such, the ATF framework suggests 
that new ideas will induce appraisal tendencies which will often translate to pessimistic 
evaluations and reduced likelihood of selection, in contrast to existing status quo alternatives 
which are familiar and thus will not evoke the same negative emotions and appraisal 
tendencies. 
Moreover, since ATF research indicates that new ideas will be perceived as more 
risky and less certain, they will be especially unlikely to be selected when decision makers 
prefer less risky and more certain alternatives.  Interestingly, the same emotions which cause 
new ideas to be perceived as more risky and less certain also motivate decision makers to 
reduce risk and uncertainty, and thus to prefer less risky and more certain alternatives.  As a 
result, ATF research strongly suggests that new innovations will be especially unlikely to be 
selected compared to a status quo alternative.  Indeed, new ideas will tend to be perceived as 
the most risky and least certain precisely when decision makers will tend to have the 
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strongest preferences for less risky and more certain alternatives.  Interestingly, since 
unfamiliar objects tend to be viewed as more threatening than familiar options (Bornstein, 
1989; Zajonc, 2001), the status quo bias may be strongest for the most novel ideas.  After all, 
since new ideas (e.g. potential innovations) are less familiar by definition, they will be most 
likely to trigger the perceptions of threat and the resulting emotions and appraisal tendencies 
which bias individuals to prefer the status quo relative to new alternatives. 
In sum, BDR research on the endowment effect, system justification theory, and the 
appraisal tendency framework (ATF) suggests that decision makers will tend to discount new 
ideas, automatically and reflexively perceiving them to be less useful.  This status quo 
heuristic or decision rule may be functional and adaptive in many decision situations.  After 
all, since significant modifications expose organizations and social systems to “hazards of 
change” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) which often threaten organizational survival 
(Amburgey, Kelley, & Barnett, 1993; Hannan & Freeman, 1977), some degree of 
conservatism and inertia is often beneficial.  Nevertheless, BDR research suggests that 
decisions regarding new ideas will be biased, since new ideas will consistently be evaluated 
less favorably compared to existing alternatives of objectively equal usefulness.  Moreover, 
since extant models suggest that creativity and innovation proceed through stages of 
innovation generation, evaluation, selection, and implementation (Anderson et al, 2004; 
Mumford, 2003), these biased evaluations can also be expected to impact subsequent 
processes of selection.  As a result, new ideas will not only be evaluated less favorably than 
existing alternatives, but will also be selected less frequently via the preceding process of 
innovation evaluation.  Finally, these effects may be strongest when ideas are most novel, 
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since novel new objects are less familiar and thus more likely to be perceived as threats 
compared to objects which are more familiar. 
H1A: The relationship between idea novelty (uniqueness and newness) and perceived 
idea usefulness will be negative, such that ideas which are higher in novelty will be perceived 
to be less useful compared to less novel ideas. 
H1B: The relationship between idea novelty (uniqueness and newness) and idea 
overall evaluation will be negative, such that ideas which are higher in novelty will be 
evaluated less favorably compared to less novel ideas. 
H1C: The relationship between idea novelty (uniqueness and newness) and idea 
selection will be negative, such that ideas which are higher in novelty will be selected less 
frequently compared to less novel ideas. 
H1D: The relationship between idea novelty (uniqueness and newness) and idea 
recommendation will be negative, such that ideas which are higher in novelty will be 
recommended less frequently compared to less novel ideas. 
Potential Moderators of the Novelty and Status Quo Biases 
Although BDR research might seem to provide a pessimistic view of the likelihood 
that creative ideas will be perceived to be useful and ultimately selected and implemented, it 
is also conceivable that additional knowledge from the BDR paradigm could be leveraged to 
mitigate the novelty and status quo biases which otherwise could inhibit the implementation 
of creative ideas.  For example, BDR research on the focusing illusion (Schkade & 
Kahneman, 1998) indicates that people tend to devote their attention to only a limited set of 
available information.  While focusing one’s attention is indeed necessary since individuals 
have cognitive limitations, this tendency does result in the underweighting of unattended 
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information.  Building on this perspective, if novel and unique ideas are indeed valuable, 
focusing decision makers’ attention on idea novelty might result in more appropriate 
weighting of information and thus mitigate the negative relationship(s) between idea novelty 
and both perceived usefulness and idea selection.  Conversely, focusing decision makers’ 
attention on idea usefulness might amplify the novelty bias by limiting attention to idea 
usefulness and thus result in overweighting of practical usefulness relative to the value of 
idea novelty or uniqueness.  As such, one might intuitively expect that instructing decision 
makers to focus on idea novelty would help mitigate the tendency to undervalue highly novel 
and unique ideas. 
However, these seemingly logical approaches might actually backfire if decision 
makers are subject to an unconscious bias against novelty.  For example, if a decision maker 
who reflexively and unconsciously devalues novelty is directed to focus on the novelty of 
ideas, the focusing effect could actually amplify the bias by focusing attention on the very 
attributes which trigger the spontaneous devaluation of creative ideas.  Similarly, if the 
default tendency for decision makers in an organizational context is to focus on usefulness 
rather than novelty, instructing a decision maker to explicit consider both novelty and 
usefulness attributes might amplify the bias by directing attention to a specific attribute 
which prompts reflexive and unfavorable evaluations of creative ideas.  Conversely, if a 
decision maker who reflexively devalues novelty is instructed to focus on identifying highly 
useful and practical ideas, the focusing effect could actually mitigate the bias by directing 
decision makers’ attention to the potential usefulness of highly novel ideas.  While 
counterintuitive, BDR research on the novelty bias and the focusing illusion suggests that 
focusing decision maker attention on “the opposite” (e.g. idea practical usefulness) of the 
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desired implementation outcome (e.g. idea novelty) may be a means to mitigate the bias 
against novelty. 
H2A: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty and idea overall evaluation 
will be moderated by evaluation focus, such that the relationship will be stronger when ideas 
are evaluated according to novelty than when ideas are evaluated according to usefulness or 
both novelty and usefulness. 
H2B: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty and idea selection will be 
moderated by evaluation focus, such that the relationship will be stronger when ideas are 
evaluated according to novelty than when ideas are evaluated according to usefulness or 
both novelty and usefulness. 
H2C: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty and idea recommendation will 
be moderated by evaluation focus, such that the relationship will be stronger when ideas are 
evaluated according to novelty than when ideas are evaluated according to usefulness alone 
or both novelty and usefulness. 
Since knowledge from BDR research offers potential insights which might be utilized 
to mitigate the novelty bias, it is also useful to examine whether BDR research might 
similarly be leveraged to mitigate the status quo bias.  For example, BDR research on the 
effects of accountability indicates that making individuals accountable for their decisions can 
attenuate or mitigate cognitive biases by fostering effortful and self-critical thinking (Lerner 
& Tetlock, 1999).  As such, it seems reasonable to anticipate that making an individual 
accountable (e.g. responsible) for idea evaluation and selection would improve innovation 
outcomes.  After all, accountability has been shown to attenuate biases resulting from 
overconfidence (Tetlock & Kim, 1987), stereotyping (Pendry & Macrae, 1996), and 
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overweighting irrelevant cues such as communicator likeabiliy (Chaiken, 1980).  
Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that appointing a Director of Innovation to be 
responsible for creative idea evaluation and selection would promote innovation.  After all, if 
accountability can attenuate other cognitive biases, it might also be expected to mitigate the 
status quo bias which otherwise can inhibit the effective evaluation and selection of new 
ideas. 
However, BDR research indicates that accountability is not a universal solution to all 
organizational problems.  Rather, it is a complex phenomenon which sometimes improves 
outcomes, sometimes has no effect, and sometimes promotes worse outcomes.  Moreover, 
accountability has been shown to amplify or exacerbate several biases which seem 
particularly relevant to the evaluation of novel (new) ideas, including ambiguity aversion 
(Taylor, 1995), loss aversion (Tetlock & Boettger, 1994), and the attraction effect 
(Simonson, 1989).  First, loss aversion, an increased responsiveness to the potential risk of 
loss, is highly relevant since the evaluation and selection of a novel or new idea typically 
implies a change to the status quo and therefore the loss of an existing alternative.  Second, 
ambiguity aversion, the preference for alternatives with less ambiguity given equal risk 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2009), is also highly relevant to the status quo bias and the evaluation 
and selection of more novel or new ideas.  After all, an existing status quo alternative is 
likely to be less ambiguous than a new idea by virtue of the increased exposure and 
familiarity provided by its longer existence (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2000).  
Finally, the attraction effect, a preference for the dominating alternative in a choice set 
(Simonson, 1989), is also highly relevant to the status quo bias and the evaluation and 
selection of more novel or new ideas.  Given the long tradition of research demonstrating the 
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preference for the status quo, an existing status quo alternative is highly likely to be viewed 
as the dominant option in the choice set of potential ideas. 
In sum, accountability has been shown to exacerbate several cognitive biases which 
are especially relevant to the evaluation of new and more novel ideas, including loss 
aversion, ambiguity aversion, and the attraction effect.  Consequently, greater accountability 
is expected to amplify or exacerbate, rather than attenuate or mitigate, the status quo bias.  
Indeed, BDR research suggests that individuals who are NOT accountable (e.g. responsible) 
for promoting innovation outcomes may be more likely to implement creative ideas. 
H3A: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty (newness) and perceived idea 
usefulness will be moderated by accountability (responsibility), such that the relationship 
will be stronger when accountability is higher. 
H3B: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty (“newness”) and idea overall 
evaluation will be moderated by accountability (responsibility), such that the relationship 
will be stronger when accountability is higher. 
H3C: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty (“newness”) and idea 
selection will be moderated by accountability (responsibility), such that the relationship will 
be stronger when accountability is higher. 
H3D: The (negative) relationship between idea novelty (“newness”) and idea 
recommendation will be moderated by accountability (responsibility), such that the 
relationship will be stronger when accountability is higher. 
Overview of Empirical Research 
Two studies were conducted to test these hypotheses which question the fundamental 
assumption that an increase in creativity will promote favorable idea evaluation, selection, 
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and ultimately innovation.  In Study 1, Hypotheses 1-3 were tested by conducting a 
laboratory experiment with a sample of university faculty from a large research institution.  
In Study 2, another laboratory experiment was conducted with a broader sample of faculty to 
attempt to replicate unanticipated findings from Study 1, test new hypotheses, and obtain 
preliminary support for the causal mechanisms underlying the new hypotheses.  Prior to 
Study 1 and 2, a separate ideation phase was completed to solicit and validate the pool of 
ideas to be utilized in subsequent studies.  The ideation phase included two parts: idea 
generation and consensual assessment of ideas.  First, an idea generation exercise was 
conducted to solicit a pool of ideas (e.g. potential innovations) for use in subsequent studies.  
Second, the consensual assessment method (Amabile, 1982) was applied to obtain informed 
assessments of the ideas from domain experts.  These assessments were used to provide 
relevant control variables for Studies 1 and 2, as well as to confirm that the attributes of the 
ideas in the focal dataset could be recognized with an appropriate level of consensus.
 CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 1 
Ideation Phase 
Overview.  Since judgments of creativity are often viewed as inherently subjective, 
efforts to objectively assess creativity and its underlying dimensions such as novelty and 
usefulness have been problematic (Amabile, 1982; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Mumford, 
2003; Runco, 2004).  However, creativity scholars have suggested that objective definitions 
or criteria are not necessary provided that the attributes of interest can be recognized with 
reasonably high consensus (Amabile, 1983).  As such, the standard in creativity research is 
the consensual assessment method (Amabile, 1982), in which creativity and/or its underlying 
dimensions are measured according to subjective criteria which are consensually validated 
(West &Anderson, 1996).  Consistent with this approach, the ideas for this study were first 
gathered via an idea generation exercise.  These ideas were then compiled for independent 
evaluation by domain experts, who could provide informed assessments and also confirm 
that the attributes of the ideas in the focal dataset could be recognized with an appropriate 
level of consensus.  The averages of these ratings then served as the relevant control 
variables for subsequent hypothesis testing in Studies 1 and 2. 
Idea Generation Exercise Sample and Procedure.  The pool of ideas for Studies 1 
and 2 was obtained from undergraduate business school students at a large university in the 
southeastern United States.  Students were informed via email by the Director of the 
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Undergraduate Program that the school was soliciting ideas to improve the student learning 
experience, and that ideas they submitted to the program would be considered for 
implementation.  To encourage participation, students were also informed that the participant 
whose idea was rated most promising by the program staff would receive their choice of a 
gift card (or cash) in the amount of $100.  Eight students (62.5% male and 37.5% female) 
voluntarily signed up to participate.  Participants averaged 20.5 years in age (min 18, max 
23) and 1.2 years of work experience (min 0, max 3).  Approximately 63% of the participants 
were Caucasian and 37% were Asian. 
Each of the 8 participants completed an online survey which included contributing 6 
ideas, which then provided a pool of 48 ideas to consider for use in subsequent studies.  To 
promote creative idea generation, participants performed divergent thinking and active 
cognitive processing (Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007) tasks prior to providing their 
ideas.  Participants completed an item from the Remote Association Test (Melnick 1962) for 
the divergent thinking task, whereas participants wrote a paragraph about the problem 
domain (e.g. the student learning experience at KFBS) for the active cognitive processing 
task (Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007).  To increase the range in the novelty and/or 
usefulness of the ideas provided, participants were instructed to provide 2 highly practical, 2 
highly original, and 2 highly original AND highly practical ideas. 
Consensual Assessment Exercise. 
Sample.  Domain expertise for the purpose of this research involved not only 
experience with teaching and the student learning experience, but also familiarity with the 
relevant creativity and innovation constructs.  As a result, the domain experts selected to 
perform the consensual assessment were 13 faculty members and doctoral students in the 
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same business school as the idea generation exercise participants.  Each participant not only 
had teaching experience, but also had an understanding of creativity and innovation concepts 
based on their departmental affiliation (e.g. organizational behavior) or research program 
(e.g. strategy or entrepreneurship). 
Design and Procedures.  The 48 ideas obtained in the idea generation exercise were 
compiled and examined for potential duplicates or “double- barrelled” items.  Although there 
were no duplicates, 3 “double-barrelled” ideas were identified and further decomposed to 
produce a dataset of 51 ideas.  Consistent with the consensual assessment method (Amabile, 
1982), domain expert participants all had some experience with the focal domain, made their 
assessments independently, rated the ideas relative to one another rather than according to 
absolute standards, and evaluated ideas in a random (e.g. counterbalanced) sequence. 
Each domain expert was randomly assigned to provide ratings of all 51 ideas for 1 of 
the 2 creativity attributes of primary interest for this research (e.g. novelty or usefulness).  
This single-attribute approach not only promoted greater consistency in ratings, but also 
mitigated potential “contamination” of idea assessments which otherwise might have been 
expected to occur based on the hypothesized novelty and status quo biases.  The domain 
experts also rated each idea according to several other dimensions, including the amount of 
effort required for implementation, an overall evaluation, likelihood of implementation, and 
likelihood of recommendation. 
Measures 
Novelty.  The Novelty of each idea was assessed with a single item “How Novel (e.g. 
New, Original, Unique) is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior 
creativity and innovation research (Dailey & Mumford, 2006; West & Anderson, 1996). 
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Usefulness.  The Usefulness of each idea was assessed with a single item “How 
Useful (e.g. Valuable, Beneficial, Relevant, Practical) is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2007; West & Anderson, 
1996). 
Amount of Effort.  The Amount of Effort involved in implementing each idea was 
assessed with a single item “What is your impression of the amount of effort involved in 
implementing this idea?” (1 = very low, 7 = very high) adapted from prior creativity research 
(Blair & Mumford, 2007). 
Overall Evaluation.  The Overall Evaluation of each idea was assessed with a single 
item “What is your overall evaluation of this idea?” (1 = not at all favorable, 7 = extremely 
favorable) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Implementation.  The Likelihood of Implementation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to implement this idea?” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Recommendation.  The Likelihood of Recommendation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to recommend this idea to others 
to implement?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith 
et al., 2008). 
Results.  To confirm that the domain expert evaluations of the 51 ideas represented 
consensual assessments, the inter-rater reliability between domain experts was examined.  
Results demonstrated reasonably high between-person, within-idea agreement, ICC(1) = 
.259, ICC(2) = .820, and both ps < .01.  Despite the variability between ideas and across 
persons, these results indicated adequate inter-rater agreement (LeBreton & Senter, 2008) 
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among raters for a given idea.  Consequently, these results provided confidence that both the 
set of ideas and the domain expert ratings (e.g. control variables) were appropriate for 
subsequent use in Study 1 and Study 2. 
However, to provide a more manageable number of ideas for use in subsequent Study 
1 and Study 2, a smaller set of 10 ideas was constructed by applying several filtering criteria 
to the full set of 51 ideas.  The filtering criteria were designed to provide a group of ideas 
which would best support empirical testing of hypotheses related to creativity and 
innovation, including relationships between idea novelty, usefulness, and subsequent 
evaluation and selection.  For example, the filtering criteria were designed to ensure that the 
ideas included in subsequent studies did indeed meet the definition of creativity, namely 
ideas which are both novel and potentially useful (George, 2008; Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010).  Similarly, to examine relationships between idea novelty and downstream outcomes 
such as idea evaluation and selection (after controlling for idea usefulness), filtering criteria 
were designed to produce a set of ideas which was dispersed in terms of novelty, but which 
were also reasonably equivalent and comparable in terms of usefulness. 
To meet the preceding objectives for idea dispersion and comparability, the set of 10 
ideas included 8 items which met the definition of creativity, as well as 2 of the “worst ideas” 
which did not meet the definition of creativity but provided additional dispersion on the 
novelty dimension.  First, 2 of the “worst ideas” were selected from the original set of 51 
ideas based on the criterion of lowest combined novelty and usefulness rating.  Second, to 
ensure that the ideas included in subsequent studies met the criteria for creative ideas, the full 
idea set was filtered to eliminate ideas which were not consensually perceived as moderately 
or highly useful (Blair & Mumford, 2007).  Only those ideas with mean novelty ratings of at 
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least 3.5 (on a 7 point scale) and mean usefulness ratings of at least 3.5 (on a 7 point scale) 
were considered for potential inclusion in subsequent studies.  Based on these criteria, 22 
creative ideas were further evaluated for inclusion in subsequent studies according to a 
variation of an existing creativity benchmarking technique (Mumford et al., 2002).  To 
ensure that the 8 creative ideas selected for subsequent studies provided sufficient dispersion, 
the 22 creative ideas were further categorized into groups with the highest mean novelty 
ratings, the lowest mean novelty ratings, and moderate novelty ratings (e.g. nearest the scale 
midpoint).  Based on these groupings, a subset of 8 highly dispersed creative ideas was 
constructed by choosing 3 ideas from the high end of the range, 2 ideas from the middle of 
the range, and 3 ideas from the low end of the range.  Combined, the 2 “worst ideas” and the 
8 highly dispersed creative ideas formed the set of 10 ideas to be used in the subsequent 
Study 1 and Study 2. 
Study 1 Method 
Overview.  Study 1 tested 3 specific hypotheses related to the anticipated Novelty 
bias.  First, the study assessed a main effect of novelty (H1A –H1D), namely whether more 
novel ideas are perceived to be less useful, evaluated less favorably, and less likely to be 
selected and recommended.  Second, this study explored the interaction between novelty and 
responsibility for implementation (H2A-H2D).  More specifically, this research tested 
whether responsibility for implementation strengthens the negative relationships between the 
novelty of an idea and its perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, and likelihood of selection 
and recommendation.  Finally, this study examined an interaction between novelty and 
evaluation condition (H3A-H3C).  More specifically, this study investigated whether 
evaluation of ideas based solely on novelty strengthens the negative relationships between 
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the novelty of an idea and its overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation. 
Sample.  The participants in this study were full-time faculty at a large research 
university in the southeastern United States.  Faculty were contacted via email by the 
researchers and invited to participate in the study.  To encourage participation, faculty 
members were informed that those who completed the study would be entered into raffle in 
which 3 participants would be selected to receive $100 (cash or gift card).  Of 2985 faculty, 
205 (44.4% female, 55.6% male) voluntarily participated in the study, providing a response 
rate of 6.87%.  Participants averaged 49.79 years in age (min 28, max 78, SD 10.94) and 
22.87 years of teaching experience (min 1, max 50, SD 17.36).  Approximately 85.9% of the 
participants were Caucasian, 5.9% were Asian, 2.2% were African-American, 2.2% were 
Hispanic, and 4.4% were Other or declined to report ethnicity. 
Design and Procedures.  Each participant was randomly assigned to 1 of 2 
responsibility conditions and 1 of 3 idea evaluation conditions.  In the responsibility 
condition, participants were informed that they would (or would not) be held personally 
responsible for the consequences of implementing the idea.  In the evaluation condition(s), 
participants evaluated ideas based solely on novelty, solely on usefulness, or both novelty 
and usefulness prior to providing their evaluations of other idea attributes such as overall 
evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation. 
The set of 10 ideas produced through the ideation phase served as the ideas or 
potential innovations to be evaluated by participants in this study.  Consistent with the 
standards of creativity research (Amabile, 1982), participants not only all had some 
experience with the focal domain, but also made their assessments independently, rated the 
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ideas relative to one another rather than according to absolute standards, and evaluated ideas 
in a random (e.g. counterbalanced) sequence.  Each participant completed an online survey in 
which they assessed all 10 ideas based on overall evaluation, likelihood of selection for 
implementation, and likelihood of recommendation, as well as the attribute(s) to which they 
were assigned in the evaluation condition.  Following completion of the survey, participants 
were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Measures. 
Novelty.  The Novelty of each idea was assessed with a single item “How novel is 
this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity and innovation 
research (Daily & Mumford, 2006; West & Anderson, 1996). 
Usefulness.  The Usefulness of each idea was assessed with a single item “How 
useful (e.g. Valuable, Beneficial, Relevant, Practical) is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2007; West & Anderson, 
1996). 
Overall Evaluation.  The Overall Evaluation of each idea was assessed with a single 
item “What is your overall evaluation of this idea?” (1 = not at all favorable, 7 = extremely 
favorable) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Implementation.  The Likelihood of Implementation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to implement this idea?” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Recommendation.  The Likelihood of Recommendation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to recommend this idea to others 
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to implement?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith 
et al., 2008). 
Study 1 Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for key study variables are displayed in 
Table 1.  Study hypotheses were tested using hierarchical OLS regression analyses which 
controlled for participant work experience and the level of effort required to implement each 
idea.  Consistent with Aiken & West (1991), independent variables were centered prior to 
computing the interaction terms to be included in the regression procedures.  The results of 
these analyses are shown in Tables 2-51. 
Analysis of Results.  Hypotheses 1A-1D predicted that idea novelty would be 
negatively related to perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and 
likelihood of recommendation.  Although the relationship between novelty and perceived 
usefulness was significant (t = 6.916; p < .01), Hypothesis 1A was not supported since the 
relationship was positive rather than negative.  Similarly, Hypothesis 1B was not supported 
since the novelty coefficient for overall evaluation was nonsignificant.  However, the 
relationship between novelty and likelihood of selection was significant and negative (t = -
3.523; p < .05), providing support for Hypothesis 1C.  Similarly, the relationship between 
                                                 
 
1
  Since study data were nested within ideas and within participants, hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) analyses were performed to confirm that the pattern of results did not 
change when idea and participant identifiers were included as random factors in regression 
analyses. 
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novelty and likelihood of recommendation was significant and negative (t = -2.618; p < .05), 
providing support for Hypothesis 1D. 
Hypotheses 2A-2D predicted an interaction between idea novelty and responsibility 
for implementation such that responsibility for implementation would strengthen the negative 
relationships between idea novelty and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of 
selection, and likelihood of recommendation.  None of these hypotheses were supported, as 
the relationships between the interaction term and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, 
likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation were not statistically significant.  
Interestingly, a significant negative main effect (t = -1.963; p < .05) of responsibility in 
predicting perceived usefulness was somewhat consistent with the general premise that 
greater accountability may inhibit idea evaluation and ultimately innovation.  More 
specifically, this relationship could suggest that the critical thinking fostered by 
accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) may actually promote the devaluation of ALL ideas 
rather than simply the most novel ones. 
Finally, Hypotheses 3A-3C predicted an interaction between novelty and evaluation 
condition such that evaluation of ideas based solely on novelty would strengthen the negative 
relationships between the novelty of an idea and its overall evaluation, likelihood of 
selection, and likelihood of recommendation.  None of these hypotheses were supported, as 
the relationships between the interaction term and overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, 
and likelihood of recommendation were not statistically significant.  Moreover, the main 
effect of evaluation condition was also nonsignificant. 
Supplemental Analyses.  Although the original hypotheses suggested that novelty 
would negatively influence idea evaluation, selection, and recommendation through a 
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negative effect on perceived usefulness, the observed positive relationship between novelty 
and perceived usefulness was inconsistent with hypothesized underlying theoretical 
mechanisms.  On the surface, these results could suggest that perceived usefulness may have 
limited influence on idea evaluation and selection processes.  However, extant creativity and 
innovation research provides strong theoretical and empirical support for the notion that 
perceived idea usefulness exerts a significant positive influence on subsequent idea 
evaluation and selection (Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007; West & Anderson, 1996).  A 
potential synthesis of study results and existing literature could be that novelty does indeed 
influence idea evaluation and selection through the negative mechanisms hypothesized and 
generally observed in this study.  However, novelty may also influence outcomes via a 
separate and countervailing positive mechanism, which could possibly be linked to the 
positive relationship between novelty and perceived usefulness simultaneously observed in 
this study. 
Since suppression models may be plausible for many mechanisms in which force and 
counterforce often coexist and have counteracting effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, Hofmann, 
1993), additional analyses were performed to explore possible suppressor relationships 
between novelty and usefulness in predicting subsequent idea evaluation, selection, and 
recommendation.  More specifically, a “net suppressor” (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) relationship, 
in which the presence of one variable can obscure the effects of another, was investigated.  
The net suppressor relationship was deemed most appropriate given the nature of the 
discrepancies between existing literature and study results.  For example, the established 
literature indicates that novelty individually will positively influence idea evaluation and 
selection, whereas study results which examined the effects of both novelty and usefulness 
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suggested that novelty will negatively influence idea evaluation and selection.  As such, 
additional analyses were performed to investigate whether novelty exerts varying effects on 
downstream variables depending on whether or not usefulness is included in the regression 
model. 
Net suppressor relationships between two variables are characterized by three specific 
criteria (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  First, when entered into a regression model as a standalone 
variable, the first variable is positively related to the relevant dependent variables.  Second, 
the second variable (e.g. the possible suppressor) is also positively related to the relevant 
dependent variables when entered into a regression model as a standalone variable.  Third, 
when both variables are entered into a regression model as predictors, each variable remains 
significant, but the coefficient on the first variable becomes negative.  Consistent with the 
preceding definition of net suppression, this third condition demonstrates that the negative 
relationship between the first variable and the relevant dependent variables is obscured (e.g. 
suppressed) unless the effects of both variables are examined simultaneously. 
As such, three conditions needed to be met to provide support for a net suppressor 
relationship between novelty and usefulness.  First, when entered into a regression model as a 
standalone variable, perceived novelty must be positively related to likelihood of selection 
and recommendation.  Second, when entered as a standalone variable, perceived usefulness 
must also be positively related to likelihood of overall evaluation, selection and 
recommendation.  Third, when BOTH novelty and usefulness were entered into a model as 
predictors, both must remain significant, but the coefficient on novelty must become 
negative.  The first condition was met for overall evaluation (t = 9.431, p < .01), likelihood of 
selection (t = 7.104, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 7.83, p < .01).  
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Similarly, the second condition was met for overall evaluation (t = 102.17, p < .01), 
likelihood of selection (t = 54.44, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 64.34, p < 
.01).  Surprisingly, the third condition was not met for overall evaluation, as the coefficient 
on novelty was negative as predicted but nonsignificant.  However, all three conditions were 
met for likelihood of selection [novelty (t = -3.46, p < .01), usefulness (t = 32.54, p < .01)], 
and likelihood of recommendation [novelty (t = -2.58, p < .01), usefulness (t = 31.60, p < 
.01)]. 
Study 1 Discussion 
Given the reasonably consistent support for the suppression model, novelty appears to 
exert countervailing forces on idea selection and recommendation.  More specifically, 
novelty is negatively related to idea selection and recommendation after controlling for 
usefulness.  However, unless the effects of both novelty and usefulness are considered 
simultaneously, the negative relationship is obscured or suppressed by the positive 
relationship between novelty and usefulness which was simultaneously observed in this 
study.  As such, these results suggest that the novelty of an idea will exert a negative 
influence on its evaluation and selection, consistent with the hypothesized novelty and status 
quo biases and seemingly counter to the established literature.  However, such findings are 
not necessarily incompatible or irreconcilable with existing creativity and innovation 
research.  Rather, they may simply suggest that the reason the biases toward novelty have not 
been observed in extant research is that the respective effects of novelty and usefulness in 
predicting idea evaluation and selection have not been examined simultaneously. 
The lack of support for Hypothesis 2, the anticipated effects of responsibility for 
implementation in predicting outcomes, was somewhat surprising.  However, there are 
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several possible alternative explanations for the results which can be reconciled with the 
hypothesized model, and thus render the results inconclusive.  A few potential explanations 
could be that participants were unmotivated or that the responsibility manipulation was 
ineffective.  However, several study results did seem to suggest that participants were fairly 
engaged and took responsibility and ownership for their evaluations and recommendations.  
For example, the significant (negative) main effect for the level of effort to implement 
control variable in predicting subsequent idea evaluation, selection, and recommendation 
suggested that participants were carefully evaluating ideas and considering the consequences 
of idea implementation.  Consequently, a more compelling explanation may be that the 
nature of the research setting and/or the study instructions led participants to feel a need to 
justify their choices even when they were in the “not responsible” condition.  For example, 
these participants were informed that they were providing evaluations for ideas which would 
be considered by other faculty and administrators at their own institution.  Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with the failure to observe differences between the two 
responsibility conditions, as well as the negative relationships between novelty and 
downstream outcomes predicted by the theoretical model and observed in this study. 
Similarly, the nonsignificance of the predicted relationships between evaluation 
condition and outcomes was unexpected but possibly still reconcilable with the hypothesized 
model.  Since the evaluation condition “manipulation” simply involved the differential 
presentation of survey items and thus did not require the comprehension of specific content, 
it is unlikely that the (in)effectiveness of the manipulation could explain the null findings.  
However, it is conceivable that the nature of the research task led participants in all 
evaluation conditions to focus on novelty, since participants were informed that the 
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researchers were interested in how people evaluate ideas.  This interpretation would be 
consistent with the failure to observe differences among the evaluation conditions in this 
study, while simultaneously observing the negative relationships between novelty and 
downstream outcomes predicted by the theoretical model. 
The lack of support for Hypothesis 1B , which predicted that novelty would be 
negatively related to overall idea evaluation, may also seem somewhat surprising.  After all, 
the study results provided support for the predicted negative relationships between novelty 
and other outcomes, such as likelihood of selection and likelihood of recommendation.  
However, BDR researchers (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) have noted that it is unclear whether 
and when accountability impacts cognition (e.g. what people actually think), what they will 
say that they think, and/or behavior (e.g. what they actually do).  As a result, the finding that 
novelty could impact idea evaluations differently than idea selections and recommendations 
is not entirely inconsistent with the proposed theoretical model since it seems reasonable to 
believe that idea evaluations may be more cognitive whereas idea selection and 
recommendation may be more behavioral.  While speculative, these results may simply 
suggest that the reason novelty exerts a greater influence on idea selection and 
recommendation than idea evaluation is that accountability impacts behavior (what people do 
or intend to do) more strongly than cognition (what they actually think). 
Overall, the results of this study provided preliminary support for a net suppression 
relationship between novelty and usefulness.  However, the study was also subject to several 
limitations.  For example, the methodological factors related to the responsibility and 
evaluation conditions appeared to contribute to inconclusive findings, providing limited 
guidance for how to mitigate barriers to the implementation of novel ideas.  Perhaps most 
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significantly, Study 1 was not designed to specifically test a suppression model, and thus was 
limited in its ability to explain the observed suppression relationships.  First, the observed 
suppression relationship may have simply been an artifact of this particular sample, and 
should be validated and replicated with a broader sample of participants.  Second, this study 
did not advance or test any hypotheses regarding the positive forces or mechanisms through 
which novelty might influence subsequent outcomes, which clearly warrant further 
theoretical and empirical examination.  Third, the study results did appear to be consistent 
with the hypothesized explanation for a negative force which influences outcomes through 
the effects of idea uniqueness and an associated novelty bias, as well as the effects of idea 
newness and an associated status quo bias.  However, the current study did not specifically 
test or establish whether different novelty dimensions, such as idea uniqueness and newness, 
actually exert independent and negative effects through the hypothesized novelty bias or 
status quo mechanisms. 
In sum, given the observed suppression relationship, there was a need for greater 
theoretical understanding and empirical examination of the positive forces through which 
novelty might influence outcomes, as well as whether and how individual novelty 
components may differentially influence negative or positive outcomes.  In particular, it was 
appropriate to consider whether one of these novelty component dimensions could trigger or 
influence the positive forces which influence perceived usefulness and subsequent idea 
evaluation, selection, and recommendation.  Consequently, Study 2 was designed and 
executed not only to address the methodological limitations of Study 1, but also to advance 
theoretical understanding by empirically exploring these new questions.  However, further 
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“theorizing” (Weick, 1995) and refinement of the model were required to provide appropriate 
guidance for Study 2.
 CHAPTER 6 
REFINEMENT OF THEORETICAL MODEL 
Based on the unanticipated results from Study 1, including the observed suppression 
relationship between novelty and usefulness, a logical next step for Study 2 would be to 
replicate and extend these findings.  However, suppression models only warrant attention if 
they are theoretically and substantively meaningful (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  As a result, it 
was important that the extension of the suppression model to further refine and elaborate the 
previously hypothesized negative forces remained grounded in the same relevant constructs 
of interest (usefulness and novelty) and underlying BDR theoretical framework.  Similarly, it 
was important to engage in preliminary theorizing about the positive forces and mechanisms 
in the suppression model prior to pursuing exploratory testing in Study 2.  However, it was 
important that such efforts focus on potential forces which could be clearly linked to the 
relevant constructs of interest and integrated with the BDR framework which provided the 
underlying theoretical foundation for this program of research. 
Refinements to Existing Theoretical Framework and Negative Forces 
Based on the preliminary support provided by Study 1 for the net suppressor 
relationship between perceived idea novelty and perceived idea usefulness, no new 
predictions were advanced regarding the functional form and general nature of these 
relationships.  Rather, the net suppressor relationships to be tested in Study 2 simply 
represented a replication of the relationships observed in Study 1, which were also generally 
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consistent with the previously hypothesized (negative) relationships between idea novelty 
and subsequent idea evaluation and selection.  More specifically, idea novelty was expected 
to be negatively related to overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation after controlling for perceived usefulness. 
H1A: The relationship between idea novelty and overall evaluation will be negative, 
such that ideas which are more novel will be evaluated less favorably after controlling for 
perceived usefulness. 
H1B: The relationship between idea novelty and likelihood of selection will be 
negative, such that ideas which are more novel will be less likely to be selected after 
controlling for perceived usefulness. 
H1C: The relationship between idea novelty and likelihood of recommendation will 
be negative, such that ideas which are more novel will be less likely to be recommended after 
controlling for perceived usefulness. 
Re-Examination of the Newness and Uniqueness Novelty Dimensions 
Study 1 results were generally consistent, after appropriately controlling for 
usefulness, with the hypothesized negative relationships between idea novelty and 
subsequent outcomes.  However, it was appropriate to further refine and elaborate the 
underlying mechanisms for the negative and positive forces in the suppression model, 
including the respective roles of various underlying novelty dimensions.  Since novelty has 
often been conceptualized in terms of both the degree of uniqueness relative to other ideas 
currently available (Amabile, 1996), as well as the degree of newness the relevant unit of 
adoption (Anderson & King, 1983), the uniqueness and newness dimensions of novelty were 
deemed especially relevant for subsequent exploration and testing in Study 2.  Consequently, 
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the theoretical framework developed for Study 1, which predicted that both idea uniqueness 
and newness components would exert negative influences on subsequent outcomes, was re-
examined to determine whether these two dimensions might play different roles in explaining 
relevant outcomes. 
The predicted negative relationship between idea newness and outcomes, which can 
be explained by a biased preference for the status quo and the resulting effects on the 
perceived legitimacy of new ideas, appeared to be robust based on the absence of any 
obvious deficiencies.  In contrast, the predicted negative relationships between idea 
uniqueness and subsequent outcomes were potentially more problematic.  In particular, the 
theoretical arguments related to the effects of availability and categorization heuristics 
appeared to confound elements of both idea uniqueness and newness.  Given a weaker 
theoretical argument for the effect of idea uniqueness in explaining the negative relationship 
between idea novelty and subsequent outcomes, it seemed appropriate to explore a more 
parsimonious model which specifically examined the individual role of idea newness in 
explaining the negative relationship between idea novelty and subsequent outcomes.  
Consistent with this approach, the Study 1 hypotheses related to the negative relationship 
between idea novelty and subsequent outcomes were decomposed to more clearly elaborate 
the predicted role of the newness component. 
H2A: The relationship between idea newness and perceived legitimacy will be 
negative, such that ideas which are more new will be perceived to be less legitimate relative 
to ideas which are less new. 
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H2B: The relationship between idea newness and overall evaluation will be negative, 
such that ideas which are more new will be evaluated less favorably relative to ideas which 
are less new. 
H2C: The relationship between idea newness and likelihood of selection will be 
negative, such that ideas which are more new will be selected less frequently relative to ideas 
which are less new. 
H2D: The relationship between idea newness and likelihood of recommendation will 
be negative, such that ideas which are more new will be recommended less frequently 
relative to ideas which are less new. 
Moreover, given the possibility that the predicted negative effects of uniqueness may 
have been significantly driven by idea newness, it was reasonable to investigate whether idea 
uniqueness might play a role in the positive forces through which novelty influences 
outcomes. 
New “Theorizing” regarding Positive Forces 
Given the need to theorize regarding the potential positive forces in the suppression 
model, yet remain grounded in the core constructs and theoretical framework of interest, the 
creativity, innovation, and BDR literatures were examined for an appropriately integrative 
perspective.  As described below, goal setting theory provided an unanticipated yet 
promising perspective for integrating the constructs of usefulness and novelty within an 
underlying BDR theoretical framework. 
First, creativity and innovation scholars have conceptualized usefulness as having the 
potential to provide benefit or value (Amabile, 1996; George, 2008; West & Farr, 1990).  
Although the terms benefits and value are often used synonymously, organizational scholars 
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have suggested that what is viewed as beneficial is ultimately determined by one’s values 
(Locke, 1990).  Moreover, values do not only determine what is believed to be beneficial or 
useful.  Rather, values also influence the cognitive and motivational processes through which 
such benefits and desired outcomes are ultimately realized, including goal setting 
mechanisms such as goal choice and goal pursuit (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Second, since usefulness can be conceptually linked to extant theories of goal setting, 
it was appropriate to examine the BDR literature for relevant insights or integration points 
which could explain how perceived usefulness might be influenced through goal setting 
mechanisms.  Interestingly, although goal setting has traditionally been conceptualized as a 
deliberate and conscious process (Locke & Latham, 2002), an emerging stream of research 
within the BDR literature has begun to explore how unconscious goal mechanisms influence 
outcomes.  For example, recent research has demonstrated that outcomes are substantially 
influenced by unconscious goal pursuits and unconscious goal shielding (Shah, 2005).  As 
such, this perspective provided a useful lens for exploring whether and how perceived 
usefulness might be influenced through the automatic, unconscious cognitive heuristic 
mechanisms of primary theoretical interest for the current program of research. 
Third, by building on this perspective, it was possible to examine whether the positive 
forces through which novelty appears to influence perceived usefulness could be explained 
through unconscious goal mechanisms.  Similarly, it was also viable to consider whether 
these effects might be linked to a particular novelty component or dimension.  According to 
unconscious goal perspectives, active or focal goals are unconsciously protected or 
“shielded” from alternative activities or distractions, particularly when alternatives are 
perceived to be substitutes for a focal process goal (Shah, 2005).  Building on this view, if 
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the novelty of an idea influences the degree to which it is perceived to be a substitute for a 
focal process goal, which in turn may influence its perceived usefulness, unconscious goal 
shielding mechanisms could be a plausible explanation for the positive relationship between 
perceived novelty and perceived usefulness. 
Moreover, the uniqueness dimension of novelty may be a critical driver for the 
positive forces through which novelty influences perceived usefulness and subsequent 
outcomes.  After all, ideas which are more unique, and thus less similar to existing ideas, 
may be less likely to be intuitively perceived as substitutes for focal goals.  As a result, more 
unique ideas are less likely to be automatically and unconsciously “shielded” from attention, 
and thus have greater potential simply to be noticed and ultimately perceived to be useful.  
On the other hand, less unique ideas, which are more similar to existing ideas, may be more 
likely to be intuitively perceived as substitutes for focal process goals.  Consequently, less 
unique ideas are more likely to be automatically shielded from attention, and thus have 
relatively less potential to be noticed and ultimately perceived to be useful.  In sum, more 
unique ideas will intuitively be perceived to be relatively dissimilar and thus less 
substitutable for existing focal goals.  As a result, they are less likely to be unconsciously 
shielded from attention and thus are more likely to be perceived as useful means for 
achieving desired outcome goals.  Building on this view, the uniqueness of an idea is 
expected to be positively associated with its perceived usefulness and subsequent outcomes. 
H3A: The relationship between idea uniqueness and perceived usefulness will be 
positive, such that ideas which are more unique will be perceived to be more useful relative 
to less unique ideas. 
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H3B: The relationship between idea uniqueness and overall evaluation will be 
positive, such that ideas which are more unique will be evaluated more favorably relative to 
less unique ideas. 
H3C: The relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of selection will be 
positive, such that ideas which are more unique will be more likely to be selected relative to 
less unique ideas. 
H3D: The relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of recommendation 
will be positive, such that ideas which are more unique will be more likely to be 
recommended relative to less unique ideas. 
In addition to providing a plausible theoretical explanation for the positive 
relationship between idea novelty (e.g. uniqueness) and subsequent outcomes, unconscious 
goal mechanisms also imply that idea uniqueness may interact with focal goal content to 
influence outcomes.  For example, the relationship between idea uniqueness and outcomes 
may vary depending on whether focal goals contain elements of novelty or practical 
usefulness.  After all, if goal shielding is driven by the degree to which an idea or alternative 
functions as a substitute for a focal goal, the degree to which idea uniqueness will trigger 
goal shielding may depend on the content of a focal goal, including whether it includes 
elements of novelty or practicality.  For example, it might seem logical to expect that novelty 
goals would promote the favorable evaluation and selection of more novel and unique ideas, 
and thus strengthen the hypothesized positive forces between idea uniqueness and subsequent 
outcomes.  Interestingly, however, BDR research suggests the opposite relationship.  Indeed, 
by increasing the perceived similarity between unique ideas and focal goals, novelty goal 
content might actually increase goal shielding and inhibit the favorable evaluation and 
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selection of more unique ideas.  Consequently, BDR research suggests that novelty goal 
content may actually weaken the hypothesized positive relationship between idea uniqueness 
and subsequent outcomes. 
H4A: The relationship between idea uniqueness and perceived usefulness will be 
moderated by focal goal content, such that novelty goals will weaken the (positive) 
relationship between idea uniqueness and perceived usefulness. 
H4B: The relationship between idea uniqueness and overall evaluation will be 
moderated by focal goal content, such that novelty goals will weaken the (positive) 
relationship between idea uniqueness and overall evaluation. 
H4C: The relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of selection will be 
moderated by focal goal content, such that novelty goals will weaken the (positive) 
relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of selection. 
H4D: The relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of recommendation 
will be moderated by focal goal content, such that novelty goals will weaken the (positive) 
relationship between idea uniqueness and likelihood of recommendation.
 CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 2 
Overview 
Study 2 provided a test to replicate the unanticipated suppression findings from Study 
1 with a broader sample of participants, as well as a means to test several hypotheses to 
extend the findings from Study 1.  First, the study tested the replication of the net suppressor 
relationship between perceived novelty and perceived usefulness in predicting overall 
evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation (H1A-H1C), in which 
novelty is hypothesized to be negatively related to outcomes after controlling for perceived 
usefulness.  Second, this study examined the hypothesized negative relationship(s) between 
the newness component of novelty and perceived idea legitimacy, overall evaluation, 
likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation (H2A-H2D).  Third, this study 
tested the hypothesized positive relationship between the uniqueness component of novelty 
and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation (H3A-H3D).  Finally, this study explored the interaction between the 
uniqueness component of novelty and goal condition (H4A-H4D) by testing whether a novel 
goal weakens the positive relationship between idea uniqueness and its perceived usefulness, 
overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation. 
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Study 2 Methods 
Sample.  The participants in this study were full-time faculty members at colleges 
and universities in the United States.  This broader sample of faculty was contacted via email 
by a panel survey research firm (Qualtrics) and invited to participate in the study in exchange 
for reward points.  From this sample, 119 faculty (53.3.% female, 43.7% male) voluntarily 
participated in the study.  Participants averaged 43.35 years in age (min 27, max 80, SD 
12.01) and 15.08 years of teaching experience (min < 1 year, max 46, SD 15.08).  
Approximately 68.9% of the participants were Caucasian, 17.6% were Asian, 5.9% were 
Hispanic, 4.2% were African-American, and 3.4% were Other or declined to report ethnicity. 
Design and Procedures.  Each participant was provided with a single responsibility 
condition from Study 1, a single evaluation condition from Study 1, and randomly assigned 
to 1 of 3 goal conditions.  The responsibility condition (responsible for implementation) and 
evaluation condition (both novelty and usefulness) were chosen based on their perceived 
practical and theoretical relevance.  For example, responsibility for implementation seemed 
most theoretically and practically relevant since individuals in many organizational settings 
are increasingly being held accountable for their decisions and/or responsible for outcomes 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  Similarly, the theoretical and practical significance of both idea 
novelty and usefulness has long been established in extant creativity and innovation research 
(Amabile, 1982), and innovators in organizations consider both novelty and practical value 
(West & Farr, 1990).  The goal condition was manipulated via a description of the school’s 
current approach for promoting student learning.  In the no goal condition, participants were 
not provided with any information about the school’s current approach.  In the novel goal and 
practical goal conditions, participants were informed that the school currently employed a 
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very novel (novel goal condition) or very practical (practical goal condition) approach for 
promoting student learning. 
To promote a constructive replication of the Study 1 findings, the remaining Study 2 
procedures were designed to mirror those of Study 1 wherever possible.  Consistent with this 
approach, the same set of 10 ideas from Study 1 served as the ideas or potential innovations 
to be evaluated by participants in this study.  Similarly, participants once again not only all 
had some experience with the focal domain, but also made their assessments independently, 
rated the ideas relative to one another rather than according to absolute standards, and 
evaluated ideas in a random (e.g. counterbalanced) sequence.  Each participant once again 
completed an online survey in which they assessed all 10 ideas based on novelty, usefulness, 
overall evaluation, likelihood of selection for implementation, and likelihood of 
recommendation.  To permit exploration of the new hypotheses and/or underlying theoretical 
mechanisms of interest for Study 2, each participant also provided online survey ratings of 
several additional idea attributes such as uniqueness, newness, and legitimacy.  Following 
completion of the survey, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Measures. 
Novelty.  The Novelty of each idea was assessed with a single item “How novel is 
this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity and innovation 
research (Daily & Mumford, 2006; West & Anderson, 1996). 
Uniqueness.  The Uniqueness of each idea was assessed with a single item “How 
unique is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research 
(Smith et al., 2007). 
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Newness.  The Newness of each idea was assessed with a single item “How new is 
this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior innovation research (West & 
Anderson, 1996). 
Usefulness.  The Usefulness of each idea was assessed with a single item “How 
useful (e.g. Valuable, Beneficial, Relevant, Practical) is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2007; West & Anderson, 
1996). 
Legitimacy.  The Legitimacy of each idea was assessed with a single item “How 
legitimate is this idea?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior BDR research on 
the status quo bias (Jost et al., 2004). 
Overall Evaluation.  The Overall Evaluation of each idea was assessed with a single 
item “What is your overall evaluation of this idea?” (1 = not at all favorable, 7 = extremely 
favorable) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Implementation.  The Likelihood of Implementation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to implement this idea?” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith et al., 2008). 
Likelihood of Recommendation.  The Likelihood of Recommendation for each idea 
was assessed with a single item “How likely would you be to recommend this idea to others 
to implement?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) adapted from prior creativity research (Smith 
et al., 2008). 
Manipulation Checks.  The effectiveness of the responsibility and goal condition 
manipulations were validated via single item(s) as the end of the survey. 
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Study 2 Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for key study variables are displayed in 
Table 6.  Study hypotheses were tested using hierarchical OLS regression analyses which 
controlled for participant work experience and the level of effort required to implement each 
idea.  Consistent with Aiken & West (1991), independent variables were centered prior to 
computing interaction terms to be included in the regression procedures.  The results of these 
analyses are shown in Tables 7-152. 
Initial Analysis and Results.  Hypotheses 1A-1C predicted that novelty and 
perceived usefulness would exhibit a net suppressor relationship in predicting the overall 
evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation for ideas.  As in Study 
1, three criteria or conditions needed to be met to provide support for a net suppressor 
relationship between novelty and usefulness.  First, when entered into a regression model as a 
standalone variable, perceived novelty would be positively related to overall evaluation, 
likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation.  Second, when entered as a 
standalone variable, perceived usefulness would also be positively related to overall 
evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of recommendation.  Third, when BOTH 
novelty and usefulness were entered into a model as predictors, both would remain 
significant, but the coefficient on novelty would become negative. 
                                                 
 
2
  Since study data were nested within ideas and within participants, hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) analyses were performed to confirm that the pattern of results did not 
change when idea and participant identifiers were included as random factors in regression 
analyses. 
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The first condition was met for overall evaluation (t = 9.011, p < .01), likelihood of 
selection (t = 7.738, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 9.337, p < .01).  
Similarly, the second condition was met for overall evaluation (t = 24.658, p < .01), 
likelihood of selection (t = 33.857, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 25.744, p 
< .01).  However, the third condition was not met for any of the dependent variables of 
interest.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 7-10.  As expected, the perceived 
usefulness coefficients remained positive and significant for overall evaluation (t = 22.478, p 
< .01), likelihood of selection (t = 32.081, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 
23.462, p < .01).  However, the novelty coefficients were positive rather than negative for 
overall evaluation (t = 3.252, p < .01), likelihood of selection (t = .113, NS), and likelihood 
of recommendation (t = 3.466, p < .01).  Moreover, the likelihood of selection coefficient 
was not statistically significant.  As a result, Hypotheses 1A-1C were not supported. 
Hypotheses 2A-2D predicted that idea newness would be negatively related to 
perceived legitimacy, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 11-15.  None of these 
predictions were supported, as the newness coefficients for perceived legitimacy (t = -.335, 
NS), overall evaluation (t = .462, NS), and likelihood of selection (t = 1.143, NS) were not 
statistically significant.  Although the newness coefficient for likelihood of recommendation 
was statistically significant (t = 2.016, p < .05), it was positive rather than negative.  
Interestingly, the newness coefficients for perceived legitimacy (t = 9.45, p < .01), overall 
evaluation (8.64, p < .01), likelihood of selection (t = 8.27, p < .01), and likelihood of 
recommendation (t = 9.77, p < .01) were statistically significant when newness was entered 
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individually, but were positive rather than negative.  Consequently, these results did not 
support Hypotheses 2A-2D. 
Hypotheses 3A-3D predicted that idea uniqueness would be positively related to 
perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 11-15.  All of these 
predictions were supported, as the uniqueness coefficients for perceived usefulness (t = 
2.929, p < .01), overall evaluation (t = 3.312, p < .01), likelihood of selection (t = 2.772, p < 
.01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 2.323, p < .05) were positive and statistically 
significant.  Similarly, the uniqueness coefficients for perceived usefulness (t = 12.77, p < 
.01), overall evaluation (t = 9.01, p < .01), likelihood of selection (t = 8.94, p < .01), and 
likelihood of recommendation (t = 9.82, p < .01) were positive and statistically significant 
when uniqueness was entered individually.  As a result, these results provide support for 
Hypotheses 3A-3D. 
Finally, Hypotheses 4A-4D predicted an interaction between idea uniqueness and 
goal condition, such that a novel goal would weaken the positive relationship between idea 
uniqueness and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and 
likelihood of recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 11-15.  
None of these predictions were supported, as the relationships between both interaction terms 
(e.g. novel goal and practical goal) and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of 
selection, and likelihood of recommendation were not statistically significant.  Consequently, 
these results did not support Hypothesis 4A-4D. 
In sum, these initial results provided limited support for the hypothesized model.  
First, the lack of support for Hypothesis 1 was inconsistent with the anticipated net 
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suppression relationship between novelty and usefulness in predicting outcomes.  In 
particular, since novelty was positively related to overall evaluation and likelihood of 
recommendation after controlling for usefulness, results were inconsistent with the Study 1 
theoretical model related to the novelty and status quo biases.  Second, the results from 
Hypothesis 2 testing were inconsistent with the theoretical argument that a biased preference 
for the status quo will inhibit the evaluation and selection of new ideas.  Third, however, the 
support for Hypothesis 3 was consistent with the theoretical argument that unconscious goal 
mechanisms will facilitate the evaluation and selection of unique ideas.  Finally, the results 
from Hypothesis 4 testing were somewhat mixed.  The lack of support for Hypothesis 4 was 
inconsistent with the hypothesized interactive relationships between idea uniqueness and goal 
content in predicting outcomes.  However, the significant main effects of goal condition in 
predicting perceived usefulness were consistent with the theoretical argument that 
unconscious goal mechanisms may promote or inhibit the evaluation and selection of novel 
(e.g. unique) ideas.  For example, a significant positive main effect (t = 2.53, p < .05) of the 
novelty goal condition in predicting perceived usefulness suggests that novelty goals may 
actually trigger a greater focus on usefulness (e.g. identifying the usefulness of ideas) rather 
than novelty.  Similarly, a significant negative main effect (t = -3.013, p < .01) of the 
practical goal condition in predicting perceived usefulness suggests that practical goals may 
actually promote a focus on novelty (e.g. identifying the novelty of ideas) rather than 
usefulness. 
Supplemental Analyses.  Given the limited support for hypotheses which were based 
on sound theoretical arguments, as well as the discrepant findings between Study 2 and Study 
1, additional analyses were performed to explore alternative explanations for the observed 
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results.  One potential explanation was that participants were unmotivated and/or the study 
manipulations were ineffective.  Examination of manipulation checks for the responsibility 
for implementation condition indicated that only 77 of the 119 participants (64.7%) correctly 
perceived the responsibility condition.  Moreover, a review of the manipulation check for the 
goal condition revealed that only 37 of the 119 participants (31.1%) correctly perceived the 
goal condition.  Combined, only 25 of the 119 participants (21%) accurately perceived both 
their assigned responsibility condition and goal condition.  Given the significant number of 
participants whose responses may have been distorted by low motivation and/or 
comprehension, supplemental analyses were performed to determine whether and how these 
issues impacted the observed study results.  To this end, study hypotheses were re-examined 
after removing the observations for all participants who did not accurately perceive their 
assigned responsibility condition and goal condition. 
This revised sample included 250 total observations from 25 faculty participants 
(56% female, 44% male) who each had evaluated 10 ideas.  Means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for the revised sample are displayed in Table 16.  Participants in the revised 
sample averaged 41.83 years in age (min 28, max 64, SD 9.51) and 14.54 years of teaching 
experience (min 1, max 40, SD 8.57).  Approximately 60% were Caucasian, 16% were 
Hispanic, 12% were Asian, 4% were African American, and 8% were Other or chose not to 
report ethnicity. 
 Based on an initial examination, the results from the full sample did not make sense.  
Contrary to Study 1 and established findings from BDR research, they seemed to suggest the 
responsibility and/or goal conditions are unimportant and exert little influence on outcomes.  
However, a very different interpretation would be warranted if the revised sample, in which 
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responsibility and goal manipulations actually were perceived correctly, produced different 
results.  Rather than being unimportant, responsibility and goal conditions would be shown to 
have a deeper significance of their own in determining outcomes.  Consistent with this view, 
the results from the revised sample provided stronger support for several study hypotheses.  
These significant findings were more noteworthy considering that the revised sample 
contained 79% fewer observations, which produced a substantial reduction in statistical 
power.  The results from the revised sample analyses are shown in Tables 17-25. 
Hypotheses 1A-1C predicted that novelty and perceived usefulness would exhibit a 
net suppressor relationship in predicting the overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and 
likelihood of recommendation for ideas.  As in the original (full) sample for this study, three 
conditions needed to be met to provide support for a net suppressor relationship between 
novelty and usefulness.  Consistent with expectations and the full sample, the first condition 
was met for overall evaluation (t = 6.544, p < .01) and likelihood of recommendation (t = 
5.024, p < .01).  However, contrary to expectations and to the full sample, this condition was 
not met for likelihood of selection (t = 1.515, NS).  As expected and consistent with the full 
sample, the second condition was met for overall evaluation (t = 8.262, p < .01), likelihood of 
selection (t = 14.418, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 8.616, p < .01).  
Finally, contrary to expectations but partially consistent with the full sample, the third 
condition was not met for any of the dependent variables of interest.  The results of these 
analyses are shown in Tables 17-20.  As expected, the perceived usefulness coefficients 
remained positive and significant for overall evaluation (t = 7.024, p < .01), likelihood of 
selection (t = 14.460, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 7.587, p < .01).  Once 
again, however, the novelty coefficients were positive rather than negative for overall 
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evaluation (t = 5.056, p < .01), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 3.374, p < .01).  As a 
result, Hypotheses 1A and 1C were not supported. 
However, more consistent with expectations and contrary to the full sample, the 
likelihood of selection coefficient was negative and statistically significant (t= -2.402, p = 
.03) based on a one-tailed test.  As a result, Hypothesis 1B received some mixed support.  On 
the one hand, these results provide support for the predicted negative relationship between 
novelty and likelihood of selection.  However, since the first suppression model condition 
was not met for likelihood of selection, the negative relationship between idea novelty and 
selection does not appear to be suppressed by usefulness. 
Hypotheses 2A-2D predicted that idea newness would be negatively related to 
perceived legitimacy, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 21-25.  Results from the 
revised sample were fairly consistent with those of the original full sample, namely that none 
of these predictions were supported, as the newness coefficients for perceived legitimacy (t=-
.532, NS), overall evaluation (t = .525, NS), likelihood of selection (t = -1.539, NS) and 
likelihood of recommendation (t = 1.131, NS) were not statistically significant.  Interestingly, 
although the newness coefficients for overall evaluation (5.35, p < .01) and likelihood of 
recommendation (t = 4.71, p < .01) were statistically significant when newness was entered 
individually, they were positive rather than negative.  Consequently, Hypotheses 2A-2D were 
not supported. 
Hypotheses 3A-3D predicted that idea uniqueness would be positively related to 
perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and likelihood of 
recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 21-25.  Results from the 
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revised sample were consistent with those of the full sample, as all predictions were 
supported.  Interestingly, only the uniqueness coefficient for likelihood of selection was 
statistically significant (t = 2.267, p < .05) when both uniqueness and newness were entered 
into the model.  Consistent with expectations, however, the uniqueness coefficients for 
perceived usefulness (t = 4.837, p < .01), overall evaluation (t = 5.729, p < .01), likelihood of 
selection (t = 2.527, p < .05), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 4.693, p < .01) were 
positive and statistically significant when uniqueness was entered individually.  
Consequently, these results provided support for Hypotheses 3A-3D. 
Finally, Hypotheses 4A-4D predicted an interaction between uniqueness and goal 
condition such that a novel goal would weaken the positive relationship between idea 
uniqueness and perceived usefulness, overall evaluation, likelihood of selection, and 
likelihood of recommendation.  The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 8A-8D.  In 
contrast to the full sample, which had few significant main or interactive goal condition 
effects, the results from the revised sample provided partial support for the hypothesized 
model.  First, although there were no significant main effects of novelty goal content in 
predicting perceived usefulness (t = .041, NS) and perceived legitimacy (t = -.169, NS), there 
were significant negative main effects of novelty goal content in predicting overall evaluation 
(t = -3.027, p < .01), likelihood of selection (t = -2.344, p < .05), and likelihood of 
recommendation (t = -2.797, p < .01).  Second, although there were no significant main 
effects of practical goal content in predicting perceived usefulness (t = -.169, NS) and 
perceived legitimacy (t = 1.292, NS), there were also significant positive main effects of 
practical goal content in predicting overall evaluation (t = -2.055, p < .05), likelihood of 
selection (t = 2.365, p < .05), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 2.825, p < .01).  Third, 
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there were no significant interactive effects between idea uniqueness and practical goal 
content in predicting outcomes. 
Perhaps most interestingly, despite the considerable practical challenges of detecting 
interactions with limited statistical power, there were several significant interactions between 
idea uniqueness and novelty goal content in predicting outcomes.  Hypotheses 4A, 4B, and 
4E were not supported since the interaction terms for idea uniqueness and novelty goal 
content were non-significant in predicting perceived usefulness (t = -.122, NS), perceived 
legitimacy (t = -.066, NS), and likelihood of recommendation (t = 1.250, NS).  However, 
there were significant interactions between idea uniqueness and novelty goal content in 
predicting overall evaluation (t = 1.986, p < .05) and likelihood of selection (t = -1.95, p < 
.05).  Since the coefficient on the interaction term for overall evaluation was positive rather 
than negative, Hypothesis 4C was not supported.  However, the results from the revised 
sample provide support for Hypothesis 4D, a predicted negative interactive relationship 
between idea uniqueness and novelty goal content in predicting the likelihood of idea 
selection. 
Study 2 Discussion 
Although the mixed support for Hypothesis 1B in the revised sample could be viewed 
as a partial replication of the net suppressor effect from Study 1, Study 2 still provided 
limited support for the hypothesized negative forces in the suppression model.  Although 
participant motivational and/or comprehension issues likely explain the null findings in the 
original full sample, the results from the revised sample also provided limited support for the 
proposed model.  A substantial reduction in statistical power might be another explanation 
for the generally non-significant findings.  However, the reduction in power did not prevent 
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the detection of several other significant effects in the revised sample, including interactions.  
As a result, the most compelling explanation for the discrepancies between Study 1 and 
Study 2 findings may be methodological differences between the two studies. 
Given the power of goal setting (Locke & Latham, 2002), the introduction of goal 
condition manipulations to Study 2 was not only a significant change, but also one which 
could be expected to differentially influence how participants in the two studies valued (or 
devalued) novelty and its component dimensions.  Indeed, results from the revised Study 2 
sample indicated that goal conditions and the novelty component of uniqueness had 
significant interactive and main effects.  As such, it seems most likely that the limited 
support provided for the proposed theoretical model in Study 2 may be attributable to the 
complex and sometimes unanticipated effects of goal setting (Ordonez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009).  This interpretation would be consistent with the differences 
observed between Study 1 and 2, as well as the partial support provided by each study for 
individual components of the model.  While it is unfortunate that these interactive effects 
may have impacted the ability to successfully replicate the Study 1 findings, they may also 
eventually yield substantively meaningful and practical insights for mitigating the negative 
forces observed in Study 1, as well as promoting the positive forces observed in Study 2. 
Similarly, the non-significant results for Hypotheses 2A-2D in Study 2 also provided 
negligible support for the hypothesized role of idea newness as a primary driver of the 
negative forces in the suppression model.  This result was also surprising given the results of 
Study 1, as well as the substantial base of prior empirical support for the status quo and 
novelty biases across a variety of settings.  On the one hand, the effects of the goal condition 
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manipulation described above are also likely relevant to the null findings for Hypotheses 2A-
2D. 
However, another relevant methodological explanation could also simply be the high 
degree of correlation between participants’ perceptions of idea uniqueness and idea newness.  
As shown in Tables 6 and 16, between idea correlations for uniqueness and newness were 
quite high within both the original (.898) and revised (.906) samples.  Moreover, the 
correlations were often even higher within each idea in a given sample (low of .843 and high 
of .925).  Similarly, regression analyses indicated that newness became non-significant when 
both uniqueness and newness were entered simultaneously into the model.  One 
interpretation of these extremely high correlations could be that the novelty dimensions are 
not truly distinct and thus not theoretically relevant.  However, the high correlations could 
also be attributable to the limitations of the idea set used in these studies.  Upon further re-
examination, the set of 10 ideas appeared to include many ideas which were both relatively 
unique and new or both non-unique and non-new, but much less variation in terms of ideas 
which were unique but not new or vice versa.  Since study results were likely impacted by 
the goal condition manipulation and/or the limitations of the idea set, it would be premature 
to draw definitive conclusions about the validity of the novelty component dimensions and/or 
the proposed theoretical model.  Further research is needed to more clearly assess the validity 
and relevance of various novelty components, both within the context of the current model 
and for a broader range of creativity outcomes. 
In contrast to Hypotheses 1 and 2, the results of Hypotheses 3 and 4 testing were 
more consistent with the suggested theoretical model.  For example, the support for 
Hypotheses 3A-3D was consistent with the proposed theoretical argument that idea 
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uniqueness and unconscious goal mechanisms may explain the positive force between idea 
novelty and subsequent outcomes.  Given the limited differentiation between uniqueness and 
newness for the ideas in this study, it is unclear why the predicted (positive) effects of 
uniqueness were observed whereas those of newness were not.  Curiously, the effect of idea 
uniqueness appeared to suppress newness effects in Study 2, much as its counterpart 
usefulness suppressed novelty effects in Study 1.  Due to the limitations of the existing 
dataset, it would be premature to conclude that uniqueness is a suppressor of newness, that 
uniqueness is more important than newness, or that newness is unimportant in determining 
outcomes.  However, these results did provide support for the potential role of uniqueness as 
the positive force in the relationship between novelty, perceived usefulness, and subsequent 
outcomes. 
Perhaps the most interesting findings in Study 2 were the partial support for 
Hypotheses 4A-4D and the underlying theoretical argument that novelty goal content may 
have negative consequences on outcomes through unconscious goal mechanisms.  On the one 
hand, prior research has shown that novelty goals promote the generation of creative ideas 
(Shalley et al., 2004).  Moreover, the significant (positive) interaction between idea 
uniqueness and novelty goals in predicting idea overall evaluation suggests that novelty goals 
might be expected to facilitate innovation by promoting more favorable evaluation of the 
most unique ideas.  However, the results of this study indicate that the relationships between 
creative idea generation, evaluation, and selection are complex, and that increases in creative 
idea generation may not promote greater innovation.  For example, the significant (negative) 
main effects of novelty goals in predicting idea overall evaluation, selection, and 
recommendation suggested that novelty goals may not promote innovation since the 
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generation of more novel ideas also triggers less favorable creative idea evaluation, selection, 
and recommendation.  Moreover, the significant (negative) interaction between idea 
uniqueness and novelty goals in predicting idea selection suggested that the unanticipated 
consequences of novelty goals may be most damaging to the most novel (e.g. unique) ideas.  
In sum, the Study 2 results suggest that novelty goals may not promote innovation due to 
their negative main and interactive effects on the selection and thus ultimately the 
implementation of creative ideas.  More broadly, these results also indicate that 
understanding how to encourage the selection of novel ideas may be especially relevant to 
efforts to improve innovation.
 CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Does increasing creativity (e.g. creative idea generation) promote innovation (e.g. the 
selection and implementation of creative ideas)?  The present research examined this 
traditional assumption within the creativity and innovation literatures by proposing and 
testing boundary conditions in which increased creativity might negatively impact 
innovation.  Results across two studies indicated that increased creativity (e.g. higher idea 
novelty) can indeed exert negative influences on idea selection and ultimately innovation 
outcomes.  However, consistent with traditional perspectives, idea novelty also exerted 
positive forces on outcomes.  These findings provide a relevant theoretical contribution to the 
creativity, innovation, and behavioral decision research literatures.  While subject to some 
limitations, this research also offers fruitful directions for both future research and practical 
efforts to increase innovation within organizational settings. 
Theoretical Contribution 
This research contributes to the creativity literature by identifying new boundary 
conditions for the traditional view that increasing creativity will promote innovation.  The 
findings from two studies indicate that the creativity component of novelty, despite some 
countervailing positive effects, can exert negative influences on innovation outcomes.  By 
proposing and demonstrating that creativity can actually inhibit innovation, this research not 
only answers the call for creativity researchers to explore creativity as an independent 
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variable, but also provides new insights regarding unintended consequences of creativity 
(George, 2008). 
The findings from this study also enhance knowledge of the complex process of 
innovation.  By integrating and synthesizing the literatures on creativity and innovation, this 
research offers new insights for how creative innovation actually unfolds from initial idea 
generation to idea implementation.  Indeed, the findings from this study raise several 
provocative questions about existing stage models employed within the creativity and 
innovation literatures, which have suggested that idea evaluation links creative idea 
generation to subsequent idea selection and implementation.  More specifically, this research 
indicated that the process of idea evaluation can be decoupled from the process of idea 
selection and implementation.  The current research also provides further evidence that 
contextual factors may be differentially effective at various stages in the innovation process.  
For example, innovation researchers have suggested that certain innovation stages (idea 
generation), may be more effectively performed by individuals, whereas other stages (idea 
selection) may be more effectively performed within a group context (Nijstad & DeDreu, 
2002).  The findings from the current research are not only consistent with the idea that 
certain contextual factors may be more or less effective in one stage than another, but 
develop new insights about how factors which promote one stage may actually inhibit 
subsequent stages.  For example, idea uniqueness was found to promote favorable idea 
evaluation, yet to inhibit subsequent idea selection and implementation.  Similarly, creativity 
goals have been found to promote idea generation (Shalley et al., 2004), yet the current 
findings suggest that novelty goals inhibit idea selection and implementation. 
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This research also contributes to the BDR literature by extending this stream of 
research to the domain of creativity and innovation.  More specifically, these studies 
explored the degree to which certain creativity and innovation outcomes might be explained 
by the heuristic models emphasized by BDR researchers, in contrast to the rationalistic 
decision models often employed by organizational scholars.  Building on the suggestion that 
heuristics may impact creative idea generation (George, 2008), this research applied 
established BDR mechanisms to predict new boundary conditions for when increasing 
creativity (e.g. idea generation) will actually inhibit subsequent creative idea implementation 
(e.g. innovation).  Since these predictions were partially supported by findings from two 
studies, this research thus provides further evidence that BDR perspectives can inform topics 
of interest to OB researchers (Moore & Flynn, 2008).  Indeed, these studies indicate that 
BDR mechanisms can provide new insights in the domain of creativity and innovation, such 
as barriers to the implementation of creative ideas and potential mitigation strategies. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although this research provides a useful theoretical framework and offers new 
insights regarding the relationship between creativity and innovation, it is subject to a 
number of limitations, which also have implications for future research.  First, the measures 
used in these studies have some limitations.  For example, the creativity and innovation 
constructs that were measured were assessed with single-item measures.  On the one hand, 
this approach is fairly common for creativity researchers, and several scholars have 
suggested that single item measures are not inherently unreliable (Wanous & Hudy, 1996; 
Wanous & Hudy, 2001).  Consistent with this view, validity may be less of a concern for the 
well-established constructs of novelty and usefulness employed in both Study 1 and Study 2.  
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However, measurement validity may be more of a concern for the less established novelty 
concepts such as uniqueness and newness, and the study cannot provide evidence of validity 
for these measures. 
It is also important to note that the underlying theoretical model involved several 
unconscious cognitive mechanisms, which thus were not measured and tested directly.  
Manipulation checks for accountability and goal condition were employed in Study 2 in an 
effort to provide proxies for the relevant constructs and mechanisms, and ultimately 
somewhat stronger evidence of measurement validity and underlying causal mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, the study can neither provide substantial evidence of construct validity nor rule 
out the possibility that alternative mechanisms may have caused the observed results.  
Indeed, it would be reasonable to argue that the results may have been produced by conscious 
mechanisms since decisions and judgments are a product of the interplay between the 
automatic and intuitive heuristic system and the more deliberate and analytical cognitive 
system (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2002).  Consistent with this view, 
the significant relationships between the level of effort control variable and outcomes such as 
likelihood of selection suggest that participants’ analytical systems were also engaged in their 
assessments of ideas. 
Additionally, the majority of the data used in the study was self-reported, increasing 
the possibility that relationships among variables might be inflated due to common method 
variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  However, since the underlying theory and predictions 
for this research are based on individuals’ subjective perceptions, gathering data from a 
single source was preferable for purposes of these studies (Edwards, Cable, Williamson, 
Lambert, & Shipp, 2006).  Moreover, the results of the consensual assessment exercise, 
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which indicated reasonable consistency among individual raters, could mitigate some 
concerns about the validity of the individual subjective perceptual measures utilized in the 
two studies. 
Given the measurement limitations of these studies, development and validation of 
improved measures for use in future research would be valuable.  Given that specific 
creativity dimensions may exert differential influences on outcomes, development of 
improved measures for individual creativity components would be useful.  Future studies are 
likely to continue to rely on self-reported measures for the subjective perceptions and 
behavioral intentions which are often core to underlying theories.  However, the use of 
objective measures and/or measures of actual behaviors would complement these measures 
and provide increased confidence in research findings.  Although some ingenuity may be 
required for the development and/or use of improved measures for unconscious cognitive 
processes, future research efforts in this area will be critical to unpacking the complex 
cognitive processes which link idea generation to eventual implementation.  In addition to 
leveraging ongoing efforts to develop valid measures of unconscious cognitive processes, 
future researchers may also be able to strengthen causal inferences by directly manipulating 
hypothesized underlying mechanisms such as idea legitimacy, idea newness, or the existence 
of a status quo alternative. 
Second, the findings from this research are based on a limited sample of participants 
and idea domains, which may limit the generalizability of the results.  With respect to 
participants, Study 1 was confined to faculty members at one research university.  Although 
Study 2 involved a much broader sample of university faculty, the revised sample included a 
much smaller number of participants.  Additionally, the generalizability of study results 
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beyond a university setting may also be questioned.  Similarly, the study findings regarding 
idea evaluation and selection processes are based on a single idea domain (e.g. ideas for how 
to improve the student learning experience in an academic setting).  However, BDR research 
indicates that idea evaluation and selection should be driven by the same basic underlying 
cognitive and motivational processes, and thus that theoretical predictions and research 
findings should be relatively robust to variations in participants or idea domains. 
Although the limitations of the participant and idea samples are legitimate concerns, 
they might also be viewed as providing a relatively stringent test of the proposed model, 
which ultimately could provide increased confidence in the study findings.  For example, 
participants in a university setting might be expected to highly value the development of 
novel ideas and new knowledge.  As a result, the negative effects of novelty observed in 
these studies were somewhat surprising, and might be expected to be even stronger in 
alternative settings where novel ideas and new knowledge may be perceived to have less 
intrinsic value. 
Nevertheless, this research does reflect a limited sample of participants and ideas, and 
its extension to broader samples of idea domains, participants, and organizations in future 
studies would increase confidence in observed findings.  Although broader samples of 
participants and idea domains are important, future research with larger samples is 
particularly needed, as such studies would provide the capability to explicitly test and 
compare alternative structural models.  Creativity researchers may find structural equation 
models to be particularly valuable in efforts to increase understanding of the complex 
interplay between creativity components at various stages in the life cycle of creative 
innovation.  Similarly, it could be useful for innovation researchers to develop and test 
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refined stage models which more clearly elaborate and unpack the moderating and mediating 
mechanisms which link idea generation to implementation. 
Third, these studies were conducted with an experimental approach.  On the one 
hand, these studies did mimic certain elements of a field setting, particularly in Study 1 
where participants were asked to evaluate ideas for potential implementation in their own 
institution.  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the findings from this research will generalize 
to a field setting.  Similarly, this research relied primarily on BDR mechanisms to explain 
relationships between creativity and innovation.  Although many field studies have replicated 
BDR experimental studies (Gilovich et al., 2002; Moore & Flynn, 2008), it is still important 
to note that the relevance of the BDR perspective for field organizational settings has 
sometimes been questioned.  Scholars have argued that the decision outcomes highlighted by 
BDR are artifacts of the research setting (Gigerenzer, 2000), and that BDR conceptions of 
appropriate decision making are overly simplistic (Gigerenzer, 1996) and inappropriate for 
analyzing organizational decisions (March, 1991).  Although scholars clearly have differing 
views of the rationality and/or optimality of various decision outcomes, the notion that 
individuals have cognitive limitations and are reliant on shortcuts and heuristics is relatively 
noncontroversial, and ultimately central to organizational theory.  Moreover, reliance on 
heuristics is theoretically driven by high cognitive load and time pressure (Simon, 1956), 
which are becoming increasingly prevalent in the work environment (Hodgkinson & Healey, 
2008).  Consequently, it is quite plausible that the predictions driven by BDR knowledge of 
heuristics will actually be more, rather than less, relevant to field organizational settings.  
However, generalizability is a legitimate concern and it is unclear whether the research 
setting provided an appropriate simulation of the psychological mechanisms involved in idea 
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evaluation and selection processes, particularly since this research only measured 
implementation intentions rather than actual implementation decisions.  As a result, it would 
be useful for future research to examine linkages between creative idea generation and 
implementation in more naturalistic work environments such as field studies.  Although these 
research efforts would provide limited ability to infer causal mechanisms, they would likely 
promote greater range in idea content.  More importantly, field studies would significantly 
increase realism through the ability to examine judgments and decisions in real 
organizational contexts with meaningful consequences.  Moreover, given the high level of 
executive interest in the topic of creativity and innovation, field experiments may be an 
increasingly viable option for future creativity and innovation research.  Archival studies 
may also be useful, although future research should examine both selected and rejected ideas, 
since datasets which include only actual innovation or idea implementation are likely to 
suffer from significant restrictions in range and sampling bias. 
This research suggests that a BDR perspective can be useful in highlighting potential 
conditions which may warrant re-examination of some of the traditional assumptions of the 
creativity and innovation literatures, and thus ultimately increase understanding of outcomes.  
Indeed, BDR’s specific focus on judgments and decisions appears to be well-suited to the 
domain of creative innovation.  For example, creative idea generation (George, 2008) and 
idea evaluation (Mumford, 2003) are highly cognitive processes which involve substantial 
judgment, and idea implementation involves an adoption decision (West,2002), whether 
implicit or explicit.  However, BDR is just one perspective within a much broader literature 
on judgment and decision making (JDM).  For example, naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
perspectives emphasize the judgments and decisions of experts and non-experts in 
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naturalistic real-world contexts (Lipshitz, Klein, & Carroll, 2006), whereas organizational 
decision making (ODM) perspectives focus on organization level decisions and the wide 
range of variables managers must consider in making decisions, including political and 
normative constraints (March, 1991; Tetlock, 1985).  As such, creativity and innovation 
researchers may want to consider whether NDM and/or ODM perspectives can also yield 
new insights and increase understanding of idea evaluation and selection processes.  Broadly 
speaking, JDM perspectives may have significant potential for creativity and innovation 
researchers who seek to elaborate the linkages between idea generation and subsequent idea 
implementation. 
While JDM perspectives might yield new insights, further theoretical and empirical 
progress will ultimately be grounded in the substantial existing base of creativity and 
innovation research knowledge.  Nevertheless, the findings from this research suggest a need 
for further theoretical development of the underlying mechanisms which link creative idea 
generation and implementation, as well as several promising directions to guide these efforts.  
For example, these studies supported the role of idea novelty as a moderator of creativity and 
innovation, and it would be useful for creativity and innovation researchers to explore 
additional moderators.  Similarly, this research suggested that existing stage models, 
particularly the theoretical linkages between idea evaluation and selection, may need re-
examination.  As a result, future research efforts to unpack the relationship between idea 
evaluation and selection, including significant mediators or moderators, would be useful.  
Additionally, these studies indicated that individual creativity components may differentially 
impact outcomes, so continued efforts to examine the role of various creativity components 
in producing specific outcomes would be valuable.  Finally, since the current research 
90 
examined only individual outcomes, it could be interesting for future researchers to examine 
whether and how outcomes and model relationships for groups may vary from those of 
individuals. 
Practical Implications 
This research also offers some interesting practical insights for both employees and 
managers.  Much prior research has emphasized how to promote creative idea generation, 
which ideally would translate to innovation through the positive forces often emphasized in 
prior research.  However, the results of these studies indicate that employees and managers 
who seek to promote creative idea implementation also need to combat several negative 
forces which otherwise are likely to inhibit the selection and implementation of novel ideas.  
Given the seeming complexity and interplay of the positive and negative forces observed in 
these studies, such efforts may seem daunting.  However, the BDR perspective applied in this 
research provides a robust and evidence-based framework which employees and managers 
can apply to better harness and mitigate the respective positive and negative forces, and 
ultimately facilitate innovation in their organizations as well as the implementation of their 
own creative ideas. 
For employees, much research knowledge is available to help to improve their 
creative output, but much less guidance is available for how they might facilitate the positive 
evaluation and selection of any creative ideas they manage to generate.  However, the 
findings from this research suggest that employees who labor to generate novel ideas may do 
so in vain, unless they also apply strategies to facilitate favorable evaluation and selection of 
the ideas they generate.  Moreover, since the factors which facilitate desired outcomes may 
vary during different stages of the innovation process, employees may need to adopt hybrid 
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strategies to successfully shepherd novel ideas from generation to implementation.  For 
example, highlighting the uniqueness of an idea might be an effective strategy to promote 
favorable idea evaluation.  On the other hand, employees may want to devote particular 
attention to selection processes, since findings suggested that unique ideas may indeed be 
evaluated favorably, yet are still less likely to be selected.  As such, an employee might 
facilitate selection of an idea by de-emphasizing its newness, including possibly borrowing 
legitimacy from a more established idea with some degree of similarity. 
The results of these studies also have some provocative implications for executives 
and managers.  For example, executives cannot expect to improve innovation outcomes by 
simply demanding greater accountability from their staff.  Indeed, study findings suggest that 
increased responsibility and accountability can result in less favorable evaluation and 
selection of creative ideas, raising clear questions about the assumed relationship between 
creativity (idea generation) and innovation (implementation).  Similarly, despite some 
evidence that creativity goals have positive effects on idea generation (Shalley et al., 2004), 
managers may want to approach goal setting interventions with caution.  While apparently 
useful in the context of idea generation, the powerful and complex interactive effects 
observed in these studies for fairly weak goal manipulations suggest that such interventions 
may have unintended and even negative consequences.  Indeed, the results of Study 2 
suggested that even very minor goal interventions can “go wild” (Ordonez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009) with meaningful consequences for creativity and innovation 
outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the findings from this research do provide other potential guidance for 
leaders who seek to promote innovation within their organizations.  Interestingly, much prior 
92 
research has emphasized how leaders can promote or inhibit creativity through a variety of 
conscious and deliberate activities such as providing necessary resources, designing reward 
systems, providing interpersonal support, or promoting psychological safety (George, 2008).  
However, despite their conscious and diligent efforts to promote innovation, the findings 
from this research suggest that well-meaning managers may unconsciously “kill creativity” 
(Amabile, 1998) via cognitive processes through which they reflexively devalue novel ideas 
generated by their employees.  Since leaders exert significant influence on decisions in their 
units, managers who want to promote creative idea implementation may find that one of the 
most effective strategies is simply to “start with themselves”.  For example, managers can 
help mitigate negative forces by increasing their knowledge of cognitive heuristics, 
developing greater self-awareness of potential influences on their evaluation and selection of 
ideas, and thus ultimately reducing their own biases toward novel ideas.  However, managers 
cannot combat negative forces alone.  Not only do individuals have difficulty de-biasing their 
own decisions (Larrick, 2004), but managers may also want to promote more decentralized 
and participative decision making within their units.  As a result, managers armed with 
knowledge of the positive and negative forces may want to focus their efforts on designing 
improved idea evaluation and selection processes, which will reduce the likelihood that any 
organizational member will reflexively dismiss a novel but potentially useful idea. 
Conclusion 
This research yielded only partial support for the hypothesized relationships between 
idea novelty and subsequent outcomes, perhaps due to several methodological limitations.  
Nevertheless, it does provide preliminary support for the ideas that increased creativity can 
actually inhibit innovation under certain conditions, that cognitive heuristics may play an 
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important but unappreciated role in the implementation of creative ideas in organizations, 
and that future research to unpack idea evaluation and selection processes may substantially 
improve understanding of creative innovation.  Scholars and management gurus alike have 
long recognized the significance of cognition for generating creative ideas and solutions, 
noting that we can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking as when we created 
them (Calaprice, Dyson, & Einstein, 2005) and that the way we think about the problem is 
often the problem (Covey, 1989).  This research suggests that cognition and “the way we 
think” are also critical to idea evaluation and selection.  Further research to examine how 
people think about creative ideas will not only increase understanding of idea evaluation and 
selection, but can also yield new insights to improve how we think and ultimately promote 
creative innovation in organizations. 
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Table 1 
Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Novelty 2.92 1.68 - .313** .240** .172** .196** 
2.  Usefulness 4.18 1.84 .313** - .948** .948** .857** 
3.  Overall 
Evaluation 
4.10 1.89 .240** .948** - .895** .914** 
4.  Likelihood of 
Selection 
3.79 1.99 .172** .857** .895** - .937** 
5.  Likelihood of 
Recommendation 
3.83 1.96 .196** .884** .914** .937** - 
 
N = 2050; *p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Variables are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with one item. 
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Table 2 
Study 1 Regression Analyses - Perceived Usefulness 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 4.627 .557 4.435 .53 4.221 .55 
Participant Work 
Experience 
.006 .007 .005 .006 .005 .006 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.175 .104 -.309 ** .100 -.302 ** .100 
Novelty   .360 ** .052 .417 ** .066 
Usefulness   - - - - 
Responsibility 
Condition 
  -.349 * .178 -.364 * .175 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
  - - - - 
Novelty * 
Responsibility 
Condition 
    -.251 .175 
Novelty * 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
  - - - - 
R2 .009   .129  .134 
∆R2    .120  .005 
N = 2050.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
Study 1 Regression Analyses – Overall Evaluation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.009 .574 .578 .231 .623 .237 
Participant Work 
Experience 
.002 .007 -.003 .003 -.003 .003 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.227 * .107 -.047 .041 -.048 .041 
Novelty   -.03 .022 -.044 .028 
Usefulness   .966 ** .02 .967 ** .02 
Responsibility 
Condition 
  -.029 .072 -.025 .072 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
  .172 .110 .168 .110 
Novelty * 
Responsibility 
Condition 
    .06 .071 
Novelty * 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
    -.106 .109 
R2 .016  .085   .087 
∆R2   .068   .002 
N = 2050.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 4 
Study 1 Regression Analyses - Selection 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.589 .61 1.264 .342 1.272 .35 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.004 .007 -.009 * .004 -.009 * .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.366 ** .114 -.154 * .06 -.154 * .06 
Novelty   -.115 ** .033 -.118 ** .041 
Usefulness   .967 ** .03 .967 ** .03 
Responsibility 
Condition 
  -.129 .106 -.128 .107 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
  .171 .116 .168 .116 
Novelty * 
Responsibility 
Condition 
    .01 .105 
Novelty * 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
    -.039 .116 
R2 .029   .069  .070 
∆R2    .040  .001 
N = 2050.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 5 
Study 1 Regression Analyses - Recommendation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.366 .604 1.093 .345 1.155 .354 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.004 .003 -.008 * .009 -.009 * .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.321 ** .113 -.123 * .061 -.125 * .06 
Novelty   -.086 ** .033 -.106 * .041 
Usefulness   .947 ** .03 .948 ** .03 
Responsibility 
Condition 
  -.085 .107 -.08 .107 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
  .153 .115 .152 .115 
Novelty * 
Responsibility 
Condition 
    .083 .106 
Novelty * 
Evaluation 
Condition 
Novelty Only 
    -.023 .114 
R2 .020   .069  .069 
∆R2    .049  .000 
N = 2050.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
100 
Table 6 
Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Full Sample) 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Novelty 4.13 1.70 - .858** .810** .321** .268** .282** .229** .283** 
2.  Uniqueness 4.12 1.70 .858** - .898** .351** .295** .279** .249** .290** 
3.  Newness 4.00 1.71 .810** .898** - .354** .269** .270** .240** .296** 
4.  Usefulness 4.82 1.57 .321** .351** .354** - .820** .613** .729** .622** 
5.  Legitimacy 4.87 1.52 .268** .295** .269** .820** - .613** .715** .598** 
6.  Overall 
Evaluation 
4.82 1.61 .282** .279** .270** .613** .613** - .615** .833** 
7.  Likelihood of 
Selection 
4.55 1.76 .229** .249** .240** .729** .715** .615** - .675** 
8.  Likelihood of 
Recommend
ation 
4.63 1.68 .283** .290** .296** .622** .598** .833** .675** - 
N = 1190; *p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Variables are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with one item. 
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Table 7 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Full Sample) – Perceived Usefulness 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.263 ** .276 6.263 ** .276 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.002 .004 -.002 .004 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.272 ** .052 -.272 ** .052 
Novelty     
Usefulness     
R2 .036  .036  
∆R2     
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model 
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Table 8 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Full Sample) – Overall Evaluation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.498 ** .286 1.499 ** .279 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.005 .004 -.002 .004 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.119 * .054 .031 .044 
Novelty   .078 ** .024 
Usefulness   .592 ** .026 
R2 .008  .369  
∆R2   .361  
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 9 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Full Sample) – Selection 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 7.065 ** .304 2.118 ** .260 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.011 * .005 -.010 ** .003 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.458 ** .057 -.243 ** .041 
Novelty   .003 .022 
Usefulness   .788 ** .025 
R2 .063   .542 
∆R2    .479 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 10 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Full Sample) – Recommendation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.762 ** .297 1.489 ** .285 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.012 ** .005 -.009 ** .004 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.178 ** .056 -.018 .045 
Novelty   .085 ** .025 
Usefulness   .632 ** .027 
R2 .020   .396 
∆R2    .376 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 11 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Full Sample) - Perceived Usefulness 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.235 ** .277 5.103 ** .272 5.108 ** .272 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.002 .004 .006 .004 .006 .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.272 ** .052 -.344 ** .049 -.344 ** .049 
Uniqueness   .181 ** .061 .178 ** .061 
Newness   .163 ** .060 .164 ** .060 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  .160 * .064 .162 * .064 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  -.184 ** .059 -.185 ** .059 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.043 .063 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    .040 .060 
R2 .024   .165  .166 
∆R2    .141  .001 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 12 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Full Sample) - Perceived Legitimacy 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.414 ** .267 5.525 ** .269 5.543 ** .269 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.001 .004 .004 .004 .005 .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.295 ** .050 -.354 ** .048 -.355 ** .048 
Uniqueness   .294 ** .060 .287 ** .060 
Newness   -.024 .060 -.020 .060 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  .060 .063 .064 .063 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  -.100 .058 -.103 .058 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.111 .062 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    .042 .059 
R2 .030   .125  .127 
∆R2    .095  .002 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 13 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Full Sample) - Overall Evaluation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.543 ** .269 5.543 ** .269 4.637 ** .293 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
.005 .004 .005 .004 .001 .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.355 ** .048 -.355 ** .048 -.174 ** .053 
Uniqueness .287 ** .060 .287 ** .060 .181 ** .065 
Newness -.020 .060 -.020 .060 .074 .065 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
.064 .063 .064 .063 .075 .069 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
-.103 .058 -.103 .058 -.072 .063 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
-.111 .062 -.111 .062 .012 .068 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
.042 .059 .042 .059 .000 .064 
R2  .127  .127  .077 
∆R2  .002  .002  .000 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 14 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Full Sample) - Selection 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 7.047 ** .304 6.175 ** .311 6.185 ** .312 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.011 * .005 -.005 .005 -.005 .005 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.458 ** .058 -.515 ** .056 -.515 ** .056 
Uniqueness   .236 ** .069 .231 ** .070 
Newness   .030 .069 .032 .069 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  .095 .073 .099 .073 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  -.121 .067 -.122 .067 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.082 .072 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    .067 .069 
R2 .059   .126  .127 
∆R2    .067  .001 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 15 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Full Sample) - Recommendation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.185 ** .312 4.778 ** .301 4.780 ** .302 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.005 .005 -.005 .004 -.005 .004 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.515 ** .056 -.239 ** .054 -.239 ** .054 
Uniqueness .231 ** .070 .157 * .067 .156 * .067 
Newness .032 .069 .135 * .067 .135 * .067 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
.099 .073 .112 .071 .113 .071 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
-.122 .067 -.114 .065 -.114 .065 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
-.082 .072   -.014 .070 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
.067 .069   .007 .066 
R2  .127  .101  .101 
∆R2  .001  .086  .000 
N = 1190.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 16 
Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Revised Sample) 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Novelty 4.46 1.61 - .862*
* 
.836*
* 
.261
** 
.198
** 
.376
** 
0.07
8 
.293** 
2.  
Uniqueness 
4.36 1.58 .862*
* 
- .906*
* 
.280
** 
.189
** 
.323
** 
0.09
9 
.262** 
3.  Newness 4.30 1.64 .836*
* 
.906*
* 
- .261
** 
.158
* 
.296
** 
0.07
0 
.281** 
4.  
Usefulness 
5.02 1.39 .261*
* 
.280*
* 
.261*
* 
- .852
** 
.478
** 
.648*
* 
.454** 
5.  
Legitimacy 
4.98 1.34 .198*
* 
.189*
* 
.158*
* 
.852
** 
- .439
** 
.679*
* 
.462 ** 
6.  Overall 
Evaluation 
4.91 1.43 .376 
** 
.323 
** 
.296 
** 
.478
** 
.439
** 
- .434 
** 
.773** 
7.  
Likelihood 
of Selection 
4.66 1.61 0.07
8 
0.099 0.07
0 
.648
** 
.679
** 
.434
** 
- .572** 
8.  
Likelihood 
of 
Recommen
dation 
4.78 1.53 .293*
* 
.262*
* 
.281*
* 
.454
** 
.462
** 
.773
** 
.572*
* 
- 
N = 250; *p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
Variables are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with one item. 
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Table 17 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) – Perceived Usefulness 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.193 ** .333 5.466 .344 
Participant Work 
Experience 
.009 .006 .012 * .006 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.272 ** .062 -.309 ** .061 
Novelty   .204 ** .032 
Usefulness     
R2     
∆R2     
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 18 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) – Overall Evaluation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.690 ** .555 2.174 ** .589 
Participant Work 
Experience 
.001 .011 -.005 .009 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.161 .103 -.085 .089 
Novelty   .266 ** .053 
Usefulness   .407 ** .058 
R2 .029   .323 
∆R2 5.690 ** .555  .294 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 19 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) – Selection 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 7.138 ** .593 2.696 ** .544 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.012 .012 -.011 .009 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.470 ** .110 -.246 ** .082 
Novelty   -.090 * .049 
Usefulness   .774 ** .054 
R2 .117   .539 
∆R2    .422 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 20 
Study 2 Suppression Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) – Recommendation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.658 ** .581 2.048 ** .628 
Participant Work 
Experience 
-.010 .011 -.017 .010 
Level of Effort to 
Implement Idea 
-.125 .108 -.023 .095 
Novelty   .189 ** .056 
Usefulness   .469 ** .062 
R2 .043   .307 
∆R2    .264 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Results reflect coefficients when Goal Condition variables are also included in the model. 
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Table 21 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) - Perceived Usefulness 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.176 ** .542 5.291 ** .551 5.249 ** .586 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
.015 .011 .016 .010 .017 .010 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.274 ** .101 -.340 ** .098 -.339 ** .098 
Uniqueness   .274 ** .057 .281 ** .065 
Newness   - - - - 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  .002 .121 .011 .130 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  -.010 .129 -.022 .141 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.024 .151 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    .043 .183 
R2 .037   .131  .132 
∆R2    .094  .001 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 22 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) - Perceived Legitimacy 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 6.478 ** .520 5.810 ** .538 5.844 ** .572 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
.006 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.308 ** .097 -.354 ** .095 -.355 ** .096 
Uniqueness   .272 * .135 .266 .140 
Newness   .070 .131 -.070 .132 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  -.217 .119 -.217 .128 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  .176 .126 .178 .198 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.010 .147 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    -.019 .179 
R2 .058   .112  .112 
∆R2    .054  .000 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 23 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) - Overall Evaluation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.690 ** .555 4.636 ** .553 4.751 ** .583 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
.001 .011 .003 .010 .000 .01 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.161 .103 -.242 * .098 -.242 * .098 
Uniqueness   .275 * .139 .241 .143 
Newness   .054 .135 .071 .135 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  -.304 * .122 -.394 ** .130 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  .190 .130 .289 * .141 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    .298 * .150 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    -.252 .182 
R2 .029   .149  .164 
∆R2    .12  .015 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 24 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) - Selection 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 7.138 ** .593 6.613 ** .620 6.709 ** .652 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
.001 .012 .002 .012 .005 .012 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.470 ** .110 -.499 ** .110 -.504 ** .110 
Uniqueness   .363 * .160 .362 * .160 
Newness   -.214 .152 -.232 .151 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  -.426 ** .137 -.341 * .146 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  .452 ** .146 .372 * .157 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    -.328 * .168 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    .118 .204 
R2 .117   .148  .166 
∆R2    .031  .018 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table 25 
Study 2 Regression Analyses (Revised Sample) - Recommendation 
 
Step 1 
 
Step 2 
 
Step 3 
 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 5.658 ** .581 4.736 ** .590 4.915 ** .625 
Participant 
Work 
Experience 
-.010 .011 -.008 .011 -.010 .011 
Level of Effort 
to Implement 
Idea 
-.125 .108 -.201 * .105 -.204 * .105 
Uniqueness   .143 .148 .103 .153 
Newness   .152 .144 .163 .145 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
  -.323 * .130 -.390 ** .140 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
  .346 * .139 .426 ** .151 
Uniqueness * 
Novelty Goal 
Condition 
    .201 .161 
Uniqueness * 
Practical Goal 
Condition 
    -.243 .195 
R2 .043   .130  .136 
∆R2    .087  .006 
N = 250.  Statistics represent nonstandardized regression coefficients 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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